Req #53052 [Com]: PHP_INI_SYSTEM level of allow_url_fopen prevents disabling it

Edit report at http://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=53052&edit=1 ID: 53052 Comment by: php dot net at site dot lanzz dot org Reported by: php dot net at site dot lanzz dot org Summary: PHP_INI_SYSTEM level of allow_url_fopen prevents disabling it Status: Open Type: Feature/Change Request Package: *Configuration Issues Operating System: Irrelevant PHP Version: 5.2.14 Block user comment: N New Comment: The url wrappers are an unfortunate feature that should have never been implemented the way it is. Still, there is existing code out there that relies on it, so neither reimplementing it better nor disabling it globally via allow_url_fopen seem like good options. Why not rely on the php_admin_flag mechanism for restricting allow_url_fopen? It will make it possible for administrators to disable it globally without letting end-users to re-enable it (for example in a shared hosting context), or let administrators leave it unrestricted and manage it at runtime (for example in a dedicated server). I find it useful to be able to turn on url fopen in a controlled manner, like so: ini_set('allow_url_fopen', 1); $content = file_get_contents('http://remote/resource'); ini_set('allow_url_fopen', 0); This approach will not be possible if only tightening is allowed, as this code will run correctly only once per script execution. Using php_admin_flag this code either will work as expected (turning allow_url_fopen on and off and accessing the resource), or will not work at all, which will be much easier to catch in development. Previous Comments: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [2010-10-14 03:22:14] cataphract@php.net We could presumably change it to PHP_INI_ALL and allow it only to be tightened, like open_basedir. It's certainly something to be considered. Still, allow_url_fopen is not that dangerous. Sure it could make the effects of some vulnerabilities worse (like if you pass unvalidated data to to copy()...), but it's not that easy to use it dangerously. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [2010-10-13 14:10:39] php dot net at site dot lanzz dot org Description: ------------ The documentation states that "[allow_url_fopen] can only be set in php.ini due to security reasons". This is a completely wrong approach, as it also prevents security-conscious developers to DISABLE the dangerous allow_url_fopen option, if it is enabled server-wide (for example in a shared hosting setup). Having a single point of control over allow_url_fopen forces the entire webserver and all websites and applications to share the same setting, which in some cases would force administrators to enable the option due to poorly written third-party code which might be unfeasible to fix or replace, which would lower security for other code that relies on allow_url_fopen being off, and it's not possible to selectively disable it where it really is not needed. The added security of restricting allow_url_fopen to php.ini only is questionable, as malicious users can use other means to access remote URLs, while legitimate users are left without the option of controlled access to remote URLs. The best scenario would be a globally disabled allow_url_fopen option (which really should be the default), with the possibility for controlled enabling of the feature only where its needed. Test script: --------------- # php.ini allow_url_fopen = On # test.php ini_set('allow_url_fopen', 0); print(ini_get('allow_url_fopen')? 'enabled', 'disabled'); Expected result: ---------------- disabled Actual result: -------------- enabled ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Edit this bug report at http://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=53052&edit=1