[php-src] Issue #14083: Heap hardening
| From: | jvoisin | Date: | Tue, 30 Apr 2024 12:48:11 +0000 |
| Subject: | [php-src] Issue #14083: Heap hardening | ||
| Groups: | php.bugs | ||
| Request: | Send a blank email to php-bugs+get-246839@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
Issue: https://github.com/php/php-src/issues/14083
Author: jvoisin
### Description
Currently, PHP's heap implementation is ~trivial to exploit:
- [BlackAlps 2022: Generic Remote Exploit Techniques For The PHP Allocator, And 0days by Charles
Fol](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-FXvUe0tySM)
- [SSD Advisory – PHP SplDoublyLinkedList UAF Sandbox
Escape](https://ssd-disclosure.com/ssd-advisory-php-spldoublylinkedlist-uaf-sandbox-escape/)
- [Gollum: Modular and Greybox Exploit Generation for Heap Overflows in Interpreters
](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3319535.3354224)
- [In the land of PHP you will always be
(use-after-)free](https://adepts.of0x.cc/challenge01-php-uaf/) and [Solution to Adepts of 0xCC
Challenge 01](https://gist.github.com/kachakil/17ea369f5372e51f37ff825345fd9248)
- [mm0r1's exploits](https://github.com/mm0r1/exploits/tree/master)
There are several hardening techniques that could/should be implemented, listed here in order of
difficulty:
- [x] prevent [unlink](https://ir0nstone.gitbook.io/notes/types/heap/unlink-exploit) abuse: #13943
- [ ] prevent freelist-corruption via shadow-pointer à la
[XNU](https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/xnu-6153.141.1/osfmk/kern/zalloc.c#L134)/[linux](https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/c942a0cd3603e34dd2d7237e064d9318cb7f9654/mm/slub.c#L485)/[partitionAlloc](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/base/allocator/partition_allocator/PartitionAlloc.md)/suhosin/…:
#14054
- [ ] surround large allocations with guard-pages, as done in
[partitionAlloc](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/base/allocator/partition_allocator/PartitionAlloc.md),
[scudo](https://source.android.com/docs/security/test/scudo/), …
- [ ] isolate types in different heaps to make type confusion/use after free more difficult, as in
[kalloc_type](https://security.apple.com/blog/towards-the-next-generation-of-xnu-memory-safety/). An
additional benefit of type isolation + freelist bitmap is that we wouldn't need the
object_store anymore to enumerate objects. A less invasive approach would be to simply isolate by
size as done in
[partitionAlloc](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/base/allocator/partition_allocator/PartitionAlloc.md)
- once this is done, heaps need to be pinned by size/type, to prevent an attacker from re-using
the memory space of a destructed heap with one of different type/size.
- [ ] allocate strings and array buckets in
[GigaCages](https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/some-brief-notes-on-webkit-heap-hardening) so
that a corrupt length doesn't allow to access anything else than other strings/array buckets.
This will significantly increase the virtual-memory usage though.