#34793 [Com]: php-cli searches php.ini from current dir which can be abused
| From: | adamg at agmk dot net | Date: | Sun, 09 Oct 2005 22:07:00 +0000 |
| Subject: | #34793 [Com]: php-cli searches php.ini from current dir which can be abused | ||
| References: | 1 | Groups: | php.bugs |
| Request: | Send a blank email to php-bugs+get-86296@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
ID: 34793
Comment by: adamg at agmk dot net
Reported By: glen at delfi dot ee
Status: Open
Bug Type: Feature/Change Request
Operating System: PLD Linux
PHP Version: 5.1.0RC1
New Comment:
I believe this behaviour is wrong and PHP should be fixed not to look
for php.ini in the current directory for the reasons described by glen.
Ideally (as I see it) is a fixed location in /etc and (optionally) in
home dir of user running the script.
Why do you think this bug report is bogus? What are the reasons for
keeping such behaviour?
Previous Comments:
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[2005-10-10 00:05:36] glen at delfi dot ee
in fact i know that documentation says so. but that doesn't
mean it supposed to be like this? can't you at least
consider securing it, by adding some option to
enable/disable this?
so i changed category to feature request!
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[2005-10-09 19:14:38] sniper@php.net
Thank you for taking the time to write to us, but this is not
a bug. Please double-check the documentation available at
http://www.php.net/manual/ and the instructions on how to
report
a bug at http://bugs.php.net/how-to-report.php
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[2005-10-09 18:13:31] glen at delfi dot ee
Description:
------------
php cli searches for php.ini from current dir, and when
current directory appears to be world writable directory,
then malicious user can put there php.ini loading malicious
extension.
php cli is used for example to install PEAR packages, and
for PEAR install to succeed it needs to be run as root.
Reproduce code:
---------------
1. create /tmp/php.ini containing
[PHP]
extension=/../../../tmp/malicious.so
2. create php extension and save it to /tmp/malicious.so
3. wait for root run any php-cli program in /tmp
4. your code in malicious.so gets executed.
Expected result:
----------------
php should not read php.ini from arbitary locations, it
should read it only from hardcoded paths, or one specified
from commandline.
Actual result:
--------------
$ strace -eopen php -m
open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/usr/lib/libphp_common-5.1.0RC1.so", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libcrypt.so.1", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libm.so.6", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libz.so.1", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libresolv.so.2", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libpthread.so.0", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/usr/lib/libxml2.so.2", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libdl.so.2", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libhistory.so.5", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libreadline.so.5", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libncurses.so.5", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/lib/libtinfo.so.5", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/etc/localtime", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/tmp/php.ini", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/tmp/php-cli.ini", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No
such file or directory)
open("/etc/php/php-cli.ini", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/etc/php/conf.d", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|
O_DIRECTORY) = 6
open("/etc/php/conf.d/pcre.ini", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/etc/php/conf.d/xml.ini", O_RDONLY) = 6
open("/usr/lib/php//../../../tmp/malicious.so", O_RDONLY) =
6
open("/usr/lib/php/pcre.so", O_RDONLY) = 6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Edit this bug report at http://bugs.php.net/?id=34793&edit=1