cvs: phpdoc-cs /security index.xml
| From: | Lukas Jelinek | Date: | Sat, 06 Mar 2004 16:11:35 +0000 |
| Subject: | cvs: phpdoc-cs /security index.xml | ||
| Groups: | php.doc.cs | ||
| Request: | Send a blank email to doc-cs+get-114@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
luk Sat Mar 6 11:11:35 2004 EDT
Added files:
/phpdoc-cs/security index.xml
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Initial revision - mixed
http://cvs.php.net/co.php/phpdoc-cs/security/index.xml?r=1.1&p=1 Index: phpdoc-cs/security/index.xml +++ phpdoc-cs/security/index.xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-2"?> <!-- EN-Revision: 1.66 Maintainer: luk Status: mixed --> <chapter id="security.index"> <title>Bezpeènost</title> <simpara> PHP je výkonný jazyk a interpret, a» ji¾ vlo¾ený do WWW serveru jako modul èi spou¹tìný zvlá¹t jako <acronym>CGI</acronym> aplikace, a mù¾e pøistupovat k souborùm, provádìt systémové pøíkazy a otvírat na serveru sítová spojení. Tyto vlastnosti èiní jakýkoli bìh PHP na webovském serveru implicitnì nebezpeèným. PHP je navr¾eno jako jazyk, který by mìl být pro psaní CGI programù bezpeènìj¹í ne¾ Perl nebo C, a se správnou volbou kompilaèních a bìhových nastavení, souèasnì se správnými praktikami kódování, mù¾e poskytnout pøesnì takovou kombinaci svobody a bezpeènosti, jakou potøebujete. </simpara> <simpara> Proto¾e existuje mnoho rùzných zpùsobù pou¾ití PHP, je také mnoho konfiguraèních nastavení ovládajících jeho chování. ©iroká ¹kála nastavení zaruèuje, ¾e mù¾ete PHP pou¾ívat k mnoha úèelùm, ale také to znamená, ¾e jsou kombinace tìchto voleb a konfigurace serveru, které vedou k nebezpeènému nastavení. </simpara> <simpara> Konfiguraèní flexibilita PHP rovnocennì soupeøí s flexibilitou kódu. PHP lze pou¾ít na vybudování kompletních serverových aplikací s plnou silou klasického ("shellového") u¾ivatele, ale stejnì tak i pro jednoduché serverové skripty s malým rizikem v "se¹nìrovaném" prostøedí. Jak vybudujete takové prostøedí, a jak bude bezpeèné, je pøedev¹ím zále¾itostí vývojáøe v PHP. </simpara> <simpara> Tato kapitola zaèíná nìkterými obecnými bezpeènostními radami, vysvìtluje rùzné kombinace konfiguraèních voleb a situace, kdy mohou být bezpeènì pou¾ity, a popisuje rùzné úvahy o kódování pro rùzné úrovnì bezpeènosti. </simpara> <sect1 id="security.general"> <title>Obecné úvahy</title> <simpara> Naprosto bezpeèný systém je pouhý sen, tak¾e jako pøiblí¾ení se v oblasti bezpeènosti volí urèitý kompromis mezi bezpeèím a pou¾itelností. Pokud ka¾dá promìnná odesílaná u¾ivatelem vy¾aduje dva zpùsoby biometrické validace (napø. obraz oèní sítnice a a otisk prstu), mù¾ete získat extrémnì vysokou úroveò zabezpeèení. Ale také znamenat, ¾e vyplnìní bì¾ného formuláøe bude trvat pùl hodiny, a proto to povede k tomu, ¾e u¾ivatelé budou hledat zpùsoby, jak zabezpeèení obejít. </simpara> <simpara> Nejlep¹í bezpeènost je èasto dost nevtíravá na to, aby vyhovìla po¾adavkùm, bez bránìní u¾ivatelùm v práci nebo pøetì¾ování autora kódu nadmìrnou slo¾itostí. Vìru, nìkteré bezpeènostní útoky jsou pouze prolomení tohoto druhu pøehnanì stavìné bezpeènosti, která bìhem èasu povoluje. Indeed, some security attacks are merely exploits of this kind of overly built security, which tends to erode over time. </simpara> <simpara> Fráze hodná zapamatování: Systém je jen tak dobrý, jako jeho nejslab¹í èlánek. Pokud jsou v¹echny transakce pøesnì zaznamenávány (na základì èasu, místa, typu transakce atd.), ale u¾ivatel je ovìøován pouze na základì jednoduché "su¹enky" (cookie), vazba mezi u¾ivateli a záznamem transakcí je podstatnì oslabena. </simpara> <simpara> Pøi testování mìjte na pamìti, ¾e nebudete schopni otestovat v¹echny mo¾nosti ani pro nejjednodu¹¹í stránky. Vstupy, které mù¾ete oèekávát, nebudou mít absolutnì nic spoleèného se vstupy zadávanými nespokojeným zamìstnancem, crackerem s mìsíci èasu k dispozici nebo koèkou domácí pochodující pøes klávesnici. To je dùvod, proè je nejlep¹í se dívat na kód z logické perspektivy, ke zji¹tìní, kde se mohou objevit neoèekávaná data, a potom kde mohou být následnì mìnìna, redukována nebo zesilována. </simpara> <simpara> Internet je plný lidí, kteøí si pokou¹ejí udìlat jméno prolamováním va¹eho kódu, zbouráním stránky, odesíláním nevhodných dat do systému nebo jiným "zpøíjemnìním" va¹eho dne. Nezále¾í, máte-li malý nebo velký web, jste cílem jednodu¹e tím, ¾e jste online, ¾e máte server, ke kterému se lze pøipojit. Mnoho crackovacích programù nerozli¹uje podle velikosti, jednodu¹e procházejí celé obrovské bloky IP adres a hledají obìti. Zkuste se nestát jednou z nich. </simpara> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.cgi-bin"> <title>Instalace PHP jako CGI binární aplikace</title> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.attacks"> <title>Mo¾né útoky</title> <simpara> Pou¾ívání PHP jako <acronym>CGI</acronym> aplikace je volba pro instalace, kdy si z nìjakých dùvodù nepøejete integrovat PHP jako modul do serveru (jako je Apache), nebo budete pou¾ívat PHP s rùznými druhy CGI wrapperù k vytvoøení bezpeèných prostøedí pro skripty pomocí chroot a setuid. Toto nastavení obvykle zahrnuje nainstalování PHP programu do adresáøe cgi-bin na serveru. Poradenství CERT <ulink url="&url.cert;">CA-96.11</ulink> se staví proti umís»ování jakýchkoli interpretù do cgi-bin. Pøesto kdy¾ se PHP aplikace pou¾ívá jako samostatný interpret, je PHP navr¾eno tak, aby zabránilo útokùm, které by pøi tomto pou¾ívání hrozily: </simpara> <itemizedlist> <listitem> <simpara> Pøístup k systému souborù: <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php?/etc/passwd</filename> </simpara> <simpara> Dotazová informace v URL za otazníkem (?) se pøedává jako argumenty pøíkazové øádky pøes CGI rozhraní do interpretu. Interprety obvykle otevøou a spustí soubor uvedený jako první argument pøíkazové øádky. </simpara> <simpara> Pøi zavolání jako CGI binární aplikace PHP odmítne interpretovat argumenty pøíkazové øádky. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Pøístup k jakýmkoli WWW dokumentùm na serveru: <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secret/doc.html</filename> </simpara> <simpara> Cesta obsa¾ená v URL za názvem PHP aplikace, <filename role="uri">/secret/doc.html</filename>, se standardnì pou¾ívá ke specifikaci souboru, který se má otevøít a interpretovat <acronym>CGI</acronym> programem. Obvykle se k pøesmìrování po¾adavkù na dokumenty do PHP interpretu pou¾ívají nìkteré konfiguraèní direktivy web serveru (Apache: Action), jako <filename role="url">http://my.host/secret/script.php</filename>. V tomto nastavení web server nejprve ovìøí pøístupová práva k adresáøi <filename role="uri">/secret</filename>, a potom vytvoøí pøesmìrovaný po¾adavek <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secret/script.php</filename>. Bohu¾el, je-li pùvodní po¾adavek zadán v této formì, ¾ádná ovìøení práv web serverem pro soubor <filename role="uri">/secret/script.php</filename> se nekonají, ovìøuje se pouze soubor <filename role="uri">/cgi-bin/php</filename>. Tento zpùsob umo¾òuje libovolnému u¾ivateli, který má pøístup k <filename role="uri">/cgi-bin/php</filename>, pøistupovat ke kterémukoli chránìnému dokumentu na serveru. </simpara> <simpara> V PHP lze k prevenci proti tomuto útoku pou¾ít kompilaèní konfiguraèní volbu <link linkend="install.configure.enable-force-cgi-redirect">--enable-force-cgi-redirect</link> a bìhové konfiguraèní direktivy <link linkend="ini.doc-root">doc_root</link> a <link linkend="ini.user-dir">user_dir</link>, pokud strom dokumentù na serveru obsahuje nìjaké adresáøe s omezením pøístupu. Viz ní¾e pro kompletní vysvìtlení rùzných kombinací. </simpara> </listitem> </itemizedlist> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.default"> <title>Pøípad 1: poskytují se pouze veøejné soubory</title> <simpara> Pokud server neposkytuje ¾ádný obsah chránìný heslem nebo øízením pøístupu na bázi IP adres, není tøeba pou¾ívat tyto konfiguraèní volby. Nedovoluje-li vá¹ server provádìt pøesmìrování nebo nemá zpùsob, jak PHP programu sdìlit, ¾e je bezpeènì pøesmìrovatelný, mù¾ete do konfiguraèního skriptu specifikovat volbu <link linkend="install.configure.enable-force-cgi-redirect">--enable-force-cgi-redirect</link>. Nadále musíte zajistit, ¾e va¹e PHP skripty nespoléhají na ten èi onen zpùsob volání skriptu, jak pøímo <filename role="php">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/dir/script.php</filename>, tak pøes pøesmìrování <filename role="php">http://my.host/dir/script.php</filename>. </simpara> <simpara> Pøesmìrování lze v serveru Apache nakonfigurovat pomocí direktiv AddHandler a Action (viz ní¾e). </simpara> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.force-redirect"> <title>Pøípad 2: pou¾ití --enable-force-cgi-redirect</title> <simpara> Tato kompilaèní volba zabraòuje komukoli ve volání PHP pøímo pøes URL jako <filename role="php">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secretdir/script.php</filename>. PHP zde bude v tomto re¾imu parsovat skript pouze tehdy, pøistupovalo-li se k nìmu pøes pøesmìrovací pravidlo WWW serveru. </simpara> <simpara> Pøesmìrování se v konfiguraci Apache obvykle nastavuje následujícími direktivami: </simpara> <programlisting role="apache-conf"> <![CDATA[ Action php-script /cgi-bin/php AddHandler php-script .php ]]> </programlisting> <simpara> Tato volba byla testována pouze s web serverem Apache a spoléhá na to, ¾e Apache nastavuje nestandardní promìnnou prostøedí pro CGI na pøesmìrování po¾adavkù: <envar>REDIRECT_STATUS</envar>. Nepodporuje-li vá¹ WWW server ¾ádný zpùsob, jak øíci, zda je po¾adavek pøímý nebo pøesmìrovaný, nemù¾ete tuto volbu pou¾ívat a musíte pou¾ít jeden z dal¹ích zde zdokumnetovaných zpùsobù spou¹tìní CGI verze PHP. </simpara> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.doc-root"> <title>Pøípad 3: nastavení doc_root nebo user_dir</title> <simpara> Pøi vkládání aktivního obsahu, jako jsou skripty a programy, u web serveru nìkdy dochází k nebezpeèných praktikám. Pokud nejsou, kvùli nìjaké konfiguraèní chybì, skripty provádìny, nýbr¾ zobrazovány jako bì¾né HTML dokumenty, mù¾e dojít k úniku du¹evního vlastnictví nebo bezpeèenostních informací (napø. hesel). Proto bude mnoho správcù nastavení jiné adresáøové struktury pro skripty, ke kterých lze pøistupovat pouze pøes PHP CGI, a jsou tedy v¾dy interpretovány a nikdy zobrazovány. </simpara> <simpara> Also if the method for making sure the requests are not redirected, as described in the previous section, is not available, it is necessary to set up a script doc_root that is different from web document root. </simpara> <simpara> You can set the PHP script document root by the configuration directive <link linkend="ini.doc-root">doc_root</link> in the <link linkend="configuration.file">configuration file</link>, or you can set the environment variable <envar>PHP_DOCUMENT_ROOT</envar>. If it is set, the CGI version of PHP will always construct the file name to open with this <parameter>doc_root</parameter> and the path information in the request, so you can be sure no script is executed outside this directory (except for <parameter>user_dir</parameter> below). </simpara> <simpara> Another option usable here is <link linkend="ini.user-dir">user_dir</link>. When user_dir is unset, only thing controlling the opened file name is <parameter>doc_root</parameter>. Opening an url like <filename role="url">http://my.host/~user/doc.php</filename> does not result in opening a file under users home directory, but a file called <filename role="uri">~user/doc.php</filename> under doc_root (yes, a directory name starting with a tilde [<literal>~</literal>]). </simpara> <simpara> If user_dir is set to for example <filename role="dir">public_php</filename>, a request like <filename role="url">http://my.host/~user/doc.php</filename> will open a file called <filename>doc.php</filename> under the directory named <filename role="dir">public_php</filename> under the home directory of the user. If the home of the user is <filename role="dir">/home/user</filename>, the file executed is <filename>/home/user/public_php/doc.php</filename>. </simpara> <simpara> <parameter>user_dir</parameter> expansion happens regardless of the <parameter>doc_root</parameter> setting, so you can control the document root and user directory access separately. </simpara> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.shell"> <title>Pøípad 4: PHP parser mimo WWW strom</title> <para> A very secure option is to put the PHP parser binary somewhere outside of the web tree of files. In <filename role="dir">/usr/local/bin</filename>, for example. The only real downside to this option is that you will now have to put a line similar to: <informalexample> <programlisting> <![CDATA[ #!/usr/local/bin/php ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> as the first line of any file containing PHP tags. You will also need to make the file executable. That is, treat it exactly as you would treat any other CGI script written in Perl or sh or any other common scripting language which uses the <literal>#!</literal> shell-escape mechanism for launching itself. </para> <para> To get PHP to handle <envar>PATH_INFO</envar> and <envar>PATH_TRANSLATED</envar> information correctly with this setup, the PHP parser should be compiled with the <link linkend="install.configure.enable-discard-path">--enable-discard-path</link> configure option. </para> </sect2> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.apache"> <title>Instalace jako modulu do Apache</title> <simpara> When PHP is used as an Apache module it inherits Apache's user permissions (typically those of the "nobody" user). This has several impacts on security and authorization. For example, if you are using PHP to access a database, unless that database has built-in access control, you will have to make the database accessible to the "nobody" user. This means a malicious script could access and modify the database, even without a username and password. It's entirely possible that a web spider could stumble across a database administrator's web page, and drop all of your databases. You can protect against this with Apache authorization, or you can design your own access model using LDAP, &htaccess; files, etc. and include that code as part of your PHP scripts. </simpara> <simpara> Often, once security is established to the point where the PHP user (in this case, the apache user) has very little risk attached to it, it is discovered that PHP is now prevented from writing any files to user directories. Or perhaps it has been prevented from accessing or changing databases. It has equally been secured from writing good and bad files, or entering good and bad database transactions. </simpara> <simpara> A frequent security mistake made at this point is to allow apache root permissions, or to escalate apache's abilitites in some other way. </simpara> <simpara> Escalating the Apache user's permissions to root is extremely dangerous and may compromise the entire system, so sudo'ing, chroot'ing, or otherwise running as root should not be considered by those who are not security professionals. </simpara> <simpara> There are some simpler solutions. By using <link linkend="ini.open-basedir">open_basedir</link> you can control and restrict what directories are allowed to be used for PHP. You can also set up apache-only areas, to restrict all web based activity to non-user, or non-system, files. </simpara> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.filesystem"> <title>Bezpeènost souborového systému</title> <simpara> PHP is subject to the security built into most server systems with respect to permissions on a file and directory basis. This allows you to control which files in the filesystem may be read. Care should be taken with any files which are world readable to ensure that they are safe for reading by all users who have access to that filesystem. </simpara> <simpara> Since PHP was designed to allow user level access to the filesystem, it's entirely possible to write a PHP script that will allow you to read system files such as /etc/passwd, modify your ethernet connections, send massive printer jobs out, etc. This has some obvious implications, in that you need to ensure that the files that you read from and write to are the appropriate ones. </simpara> <simpara> Consider the following script, where a user indicates that they'd like to delete a file in their home directory. This assumes a situation where a PHP web interface is regularly used for file management, so the Apache user is allowed to delete files in the user home directories. </simpara> <para> <example> <title>Poor variable checking leads to....</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // remove a file from the user's home directory $username = $_POST['user_submitted_name']; $homedir = "/home/$username"; $file_to_delete = "$userfile"; unlink ("$homedir/$userfile"); echo "$file_to_delete has been deleted!"; ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> Since the username is postable from a user form, they can submit a username and file belonging to someone else, and delete files. In this case, you'd want to use some other form of authentication. Consider what could happen if the variables submitted were "../etc/" and "passwd". The code would then effectively read: <example> <title>... A filesystem attack</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // removes a file from anywhere on the hard drive that // the PHP user has access to. If PHP has root access: $username = "../etc/"; $homedir = "/home/../etc/"; $file_to_delete = "passwd"; unlink ("/home/../etc/passwd"); echo "/home/../etc/passwd has been deleted!"; ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> There are two important measures you should take to prevent these issues. <itemizedlist> <listitem> <simpara> Only allow limited permissions to the PHP web user binary. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Check all variables which are submitted. </simpara> </listitem> </itemizedlist> Here is an improved script: <example> <title>More secure file name checking</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // removes a file from the hard drive that // the PHP user has access to. $username = $_SERVER['REMOTE_USER']; // using an authentication mechanisim $homedir = "/home/$username"; $file_to_delete = basename("$userfile"); // strip paths unlink ($homedir/$file_to_delete); $fp = fopen("/home/logging/filedelete.log","+a"); //log the deletion $logstring = "$username $homedir $file_to_delete"; fputs ($fp, $logstring); fclose($fp); echo "$file_to_delete has been deleted!"; ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> However, even this is not without it's flaws. If your authentication system allowed users to create their own user logins, and a user chose the login "../etc/", the system is once again exposed. For this reason, you may prefer to write a more customized check: <example> <title>Bezpeènìj¹í test názvu souboru</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php $username = $_SERVER['REMOTE_USER']; // using an authentication mechanisim $homedir = "/home/$username"; if (!ereg('^[^./][^/]*$', $userfile)) die('bad filename'); //die, do not process if (!ereg('^[^./][^/]*$', $username)) die('bad username'); //die, do not process //etc... ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> Depending on your operating system, there are a wide variety of files which you should be concerned about, including device entries (/dev/ or COM1), configuration files (/etc/ files and the .ini files), well known file storage areas (/home/, My Documents), etc. For this reason, it's usually easier to create a policy where you forbid everything except for what you explicitly allow. </para> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.database"> <title>Bezpeènost databází</title> <simpara> Nowadays, databases are cardinal components of any web based application by enabling websites to provide varying dynamic content. Since very sensitive or secret information can be stored in a database, you should strongly consider protecting your databases. </simpara> <simpara> To retrieve or to store any information you need to connect to the database, send a legitimate query, fetch the result, and close the connection. Nowadays, the commonly used query language in this interaction is the Structured Query Language (SQL). See how an attacker can <link linkend="security.database.sql-injection">tamper with an SQL query</link>. </simpara> <simpara> As you can surmise, PHP cannot protect your database by itself. The following sections aim to be an introduction into the very basics of how to access and manipulate databases within PHP scripts. </simpara> <simpara> Keep in mind this simple rule: defense in depth. The more places you take action to increase the protection of your database, the less probability of an attacker succeeding in exposing or abusing any stored information. Good design of the database schema and the application deals with your greatest fears. </simpara> <sect2 id="security.database.design"> <title>Návrh databází</title> <simpara> The first step is always to create the database, unless you want to use one from a third party. When a database is created, it is assigned to an owner, who executed the creation statement. Usually, only the owner (or a superuser) can do anything with the objects in that database, and in order to allow other users to use it, privileges must be granted. </simpara> <simpara> Applications should never connect to the database as its owner or a superuser, because these users can execute any query at will, for example, modifying the schema (e.g. dropping tables) or deleting its entire content. </simpara> <simpara> You may create different database users for every aspect of your application with very limited rights to database objects. The most required privileges should be granted only, and avoid that the same user can interact with the database in different use cases. This means that if intruders gain access to your database using your applications credentials, they can only effect as many changes as your application can. </simpara> <simpara> You are encouraged not to implement all the business logic in the web application (i.e. your script), instead do it in the database schema using views, triggers or rules. If the system evolves, new ports will be intended to open to the database, and you have to re-implement the logic in each separate database client. Over and above, triggers can be used to transparently and automatically handle fields, which often provides insight when debugging problems with your application or tracing back transactions. </simpara> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.database.connection"> <title>Pøipojení na databázi</title> <simpara> You may want to estabilish the connections over SSL to encrypt client/server communications for increased security, or you can use ssh to encrypt the network connection between clients and the database server. If either of these is used, then monitoring your traffic and gaining information about your database will be difficult for a would-be attacker. </simpara> <!--simpara> If your database server has native SSL support, consider using <link linkend="ref.openssl">OpenSSL functions</link> in communication between PHP and database via SSL. </simpara--> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.database.storage"> <title>©ifrovaný model ulo¾ení dat</title> <simpara> SSL/SSH protects data travelling from the client to the server, SSL/SSH does not protect the persistent data stored in a database. SSL is an on-the-wire protocol. </simpara> <simpara> Once an attacker gains access to your database directly (bypassing the webserver), the stored sensitive data may be exposed or misused, unless the information is protected by the database itself. Encrypting the data is a good way to mitigate this threat, but very few databases offer this type of data encryption. </simpara> <simpara> The easiest way to work around this problem is to first create your own encryption package, and then use it from within your PHP scripts. PHP can assist you in this with several extensions, such as <link linkend="ref.mcrypt">Mcrypt</link> and <link linkend="ref.mhash">Mhash</link>, covering a wide variety of encryption algorithms. The script encrypts the data before inserting it into the database, and decrypts it when retrieving. See the references for further examples of how encryption works. </simpara> <simpara> In case of truly hidden data, if its raw representation is not needed (i.e. not be displayed), hashing may also be taken into consideration. The well-known example for the hashing is storing the MD5 hash of a password in a database, instead of the password itself. See also <function>crypt</function> and <function>md5</function>. </simpara> <example> <title>Using hashed password field</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ // storing password hash $query = sprintf("INSERT INTO users(name,pwd) VALUES('%s','%s');", addslashes($username), md5($password)); $result = pg_exec($connection, $query); // querying if user submitted the right password $query = sprintf("SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE name='%s' AND pwd='%s';", addslashes($username), md5($password)); $result = pg_exec($connection, $query); if (pg_numrows($result) > 0) { echo "Welcome, $username!"; } else { echo "Authentication failed for $username."; } ]]> </programlisting> </example> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.database.sql-injection"> <title>SQL Injection (vpa¹ování SQL kódu)</title> <simpara> Many web developers are unaware of how SQL queries can be tampered with, and assume that an SQL query is a trusted command. It means that SQL queries are able to circumvent access controls, thereby bypassing standard authentication and authorization checks, and sometimes SQL queries even may allow access to host operating system level commands. </simpara> <simpara> Direct SQL Command Injection is a technique where an attacker creates or alters existing SQL commands to expose hidden data, or to override valuable ones, or even to execute dangerous system level commands on the database host. This is accomplished by the application taking user input and combining it with static parameters to build a SQL query. The following examples are based on true stories, unfortunately. </simpara> <para> Owing to the lack of input validation and connecting to the database on behalf of a superuser or the one who can create users, the attacker may create a superuser in your database. <example> <title> Splitting the result set into pages ... and making superusers (PostgreSQL and MySQL) </title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $offset = argv[0]; // beware, no input validation! $query = "SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET $offset;"; // with PostgreSQL $result = pg_exec($conn, $query); // with MySQL $result = mysql_query($query); ]]> </programlisting> </example> Normal users click on the 'next', 'prev' links where the <varname>$offset</varname> is encoded into the URL. The script expects that the incoming <varname>$offset</varname> is a decimal number. However, what if someone tries to break in by appending a <function>urlencode</function>'d form of the following to the URL <informalexample> <programlisting> <![CDATA[ // in case of PostgreSQL 0; insert into pg_shadow(usename,usesysid,usesuper,usecatupd,passwd) select 'crack', usesysid, 't','t','crack' from pg_shadow where usename='postgres'; -- // in case of MySQL 0; UPDATE user SET Password=PASSWORD('crack') WHERE user='root'; FLUSH PRIVILEGES; ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> If it happened, then the script would present a superuser access to him. Note that <literal>0;</literal> is to supply a valid offset to the original query and to terminate it. </para> <note> <para> It is common technique to force the SQL parser to ignore the rest of the query written by the developer with <literal>--</literal> which is the comment sign in SQL. </para> </note> <para> A feasible way to gain passwords is to circumvent your search result pages. The only thing the attacker needs to do is to see if there are any submitted variables used in SQL statements which are not handled properly. These filters can be set commonly in a preceding form to customize <literal>WHERE, ORDER BY, LIMIT</literal> and <literal>OFFSET</literal> clauses in <literal>SELECT</literal> statements. If your database supports the <literal>UNION</literal> construct, the attacker may try to append an entire query to the original one to list passwords from an arbitrary table. Using encrypted password fields is strongly encouraged. <example> <title> Listing out articles ... and some passwords (any database server) </title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $query = "SELECT id, name, inserted, size FROM products WHERE size = '$size' ORDER BY $order LIMIT $limit, $offset;"; $result = odbc_exec($conn, $query); ]]> </programlisting> </example> The static part of the query can be combined with another <literal>SELECT</literal> statement which reveals all passwords: <informalexample> <programlisting> <![CDATA[ ' union select '1', concat(uname||'-'||passwd) as name, '1971-01-01', '0' from usertable; -- ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> If this query (playing with the <literal>'</literal> and <literal>--</literal>) were assigned to one of the variables used in <varname>$query</varname>, the query beast awakened. </para> <para> SQL UPDATE's are also susceptible to attack. These queries are also threatened by chopping and appending an entirely new query to it. But the attacker might fiddle with the <literal>SET</literal> clause. In this case some schema information must be possessed to manipulate the query successfully. This can be acquired by examining the form variable names, or just simply brute forcing. There are not so many naming conventions for fields storing passwords or usernames. <example> <title> From resetting a password ... to gaining more privileges (any database server) </title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='$pwd' WHERE uid='$uid';"; ]]> </programlisting> </example> But a malicious user sumbits the value <literal>' or uid like'%admin%'; --</literal> to <varname>$uid</varname> to change the admin's password, or simply sets <varname>$pwd</varname> to <literal>"hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 "</literal> (with a trailing space) to gain more privileges. Then, the query will be twisted: <informalexample> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ // $uid == ' or uid like'%admin%'; -- $query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='...' WHERE uid='' or uid like '%admin%'; --"; // $pwd == "hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 " $query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 WHERE ...;" ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> </para> <para> A frightening example how operating system level commands can be accessed on some database hosts. <example> <title>Attacking the database hosts operating system (MSSQL Server)</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $query = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE id LIKE '%$prod%'"; $result = mssql_query($query); ]]> </programlisting> </example> If attacker submits the value <literal>a%' exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD' --</literal> to <varname>$prod</varname>, then the <varname>$query</varname> will be: <informalexample> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $query = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE id LIKE '%a%' exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD'--"; $result = mssql_query($query); ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> MSSQL Server executes the SQL statements in the batch including a command to add a new user to the local accounts database. If this application were running as <literal>sa</literal> and the MSSQLSERVER service is running with sufficient privileges, the attacker would now have an account with which to access this machine. </para> <note> <para> Some of the examples above is tied to a specific database server. This does not mean that a similar attack is impossible against other products. Your database server may be similarly vulnerable in another manner. </para> </note> <sect3 id="security.database.avoiding"> <title>Techniky ochrany</title> <simpara> You may plead that the attacker must possess a piece of information about the database schema in most examples. You are right, but you never know when and how it can be taken out, and if it happens, your database may be exposed. If you are using an open source, or publicly available database handling package, which may belong to a content management system or forum, the intruders easily produce a copy of a piece of your code. It may be also a security risk if it is a poorly designed one. </simpara> <simpara> These attacks are mainly based on exploiting the code not being written with security in mind. Never trust any kind of input, especially that which comes from the client side, even though it comes from a select box, a hidden input field or a cookie. The first example shows that such a blameless query can cause disasters. </simpara> <itemizedlist> <listitem> <simpara> Nikdy se nepøipojujte na databázi jako superu¾ivatel nebo vlastník databáze. V¾dy pou¾ívejte zvlá¹tní u¾ivatele s velmi omezenými právy. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Check if the given input has the expected data type. PHP has a wide range of input validating functions, from the simplest ones found in <link linkend="ref.variables">Variable Functions</link> and in <link linkend="ref.ctype">Character Type Functions</link> (e.g. <function>is_numeric</function>, <function>ctype_digit</function> respectively) and onwards to the <link linkend="ref.pcre">Perl compatible Regular Expressions</link> support. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <para> If the application waits for numerical input, consider verifying data with <function>is_numeric</function>, or silently change its type using <function>settype</function>, or use its numeric representation by <function>sprintf</function>. <example> <title>A more secure way to compose a query for paging</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ settype($offset, 'integer'); $query = "SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET $offset;"; // please note %d in the format string, using %s would be meaningless $query = sprintf("SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET %d;", $offset); ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Quote each non numeric user input which is passed to the database with <function>addslashes</function> or <function>addcslashes</function>. See <link linkend="security.database.storage">the first example</link>. As the examples shows, quotes burnt into the static part of the query is not enough, and can be easily cracked. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Do not print out any database specific information, especially about the schema, by fair means or foul. See also <link linkend="security.errors">Error Reporting</link> and <link linkend="ref.errorfunc">Error Handling and Logging Functions</link>. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> You may use stored procedures and previously defined cursors to abstract data access so that users do not directly access tables or views, but this solution has another impacts. </simpara> </listitem> </itemizedlist> <simpara> Besides these, you benefit from logging queries either within your script or by the database itself, if it supports logging. Obviously, the logging is unable to prevent any harmful attempt, but it can be helpful to trace back which application has been circumvented. The log is not useful by itself, but through the information it contains. More detail is generally better than less. </simpara> </sect3> </sect2> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.errors"> <title>Hlá¹ení chyb</title> <para> With PHP security, there are two sides to error reporting. One is beneficial to increasing security, the other is detrimental. </para> <para> A standard attack tactic involves profiling a system by feeding it improper data, and checking for the kinds, and contexts, of the errors which are returned. This allows the system cracker to probe for information about the server, to determine possible weaknesses. For example, if an attacker had gleaned information about a page based on a prior form submission, they may attempt to override variables, or modify them: <example> <title>Attacking Variables with a custom HTML page</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <form method="post" action="attacktarget?username=badfoo&password=badfoo"> <input type="hidden" name="username" value="badfoo" /> <input type="hidden" name="password" value="badfoo" /> </form> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> The PHP errors which are normally returned can be quite helpful to a developer who is trying to debug a script, indicating such things as the function or file that failed, the PHP file it failed in, and the line number which the failure occured in. This is all information that can be exploited. It is not uncommon for a php developer to use <function>show_source</function>, <function>highlight_string</function>, or <function>highlight_file</function> as a debugging measure, but in a live site, this can expose hidden variables, unchecked syntax, and other dangerous information. Especially dangerous is running code from known sources with built-in debugging handlers, or using common debugging techniques. If the attacker can determine what general technique you are using, they may try to brute-force a page, by sending various common debugging strings: <example> <title>Exploiting common debugging variables</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <form method="post" action="attacktarget?errors=Y&showerrors=1&debug=1"> <input type="hidden" name="errors" value="Y" /> <input type="hidden" name="showerrors" value="1" /> <input type="hidden" name="debug" value="1" /> </form> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> Regardless of the method of error handling, the ability to probe a system for errors leads to providing an attacker with more information. </para> <para> For example, the very style of a generic PHP error indicates a system is running PHP. If the attacker was looking at an .html page, and wanted to probe for the back-end (to look for known weaknesses in the system), by feeding it the wrong data they may be able to determine that a system was built with PHP. </para> <para> A function error can indicate whether a system may be running a specific database engine, or give clues as to how a web page or programmed or designed. This allows for deeper investigation into open database ports, or to look for specific bugs or weaknesses in a web page. By feeding different pieces of bad data, for example, an attacker can determine the order of authentication in a script, (from the line number errors) as well as probe for exploits that may be exploited in different locations in the script. </para> <para> A filesystem or general PHP error can indicate what permissions the webserver has, as well as the structure and organization of files on the web server. Developer written error code can aggravate this problem, leading to easy exploitation of formerly "hidden" information. </para> <para> There are three major solutions to this issue. The first is to scrutinize all functions, and attempt to compensate for the bulk of the errors. The second is to disable error reporting entirely on the running code. The third is to use PHP's custom error handling functions to create your own error handler. Depending on your security policy, you may find all three to be applicable to your situation. </para> <para> One way of catching this issue ahead of time is to make use of PHP's own <function>error_reporting</function>, to help you secure your code and find variable usage that may be dangerous. By testing your code, prior to deployment, with E_ALL, you can quickly find areas where your variables may be open to poisoning or modification in other ways. Once you are ready for deployment, by using E_NONE, you insulate your code from probing. <example> <title>Finding dangerous variables with E_ALL</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php if ($username) { // Not initialized or checked before usage $good_login = 1; } if ($good_login == 1) { // If above test fails, not initialized or checked before usage readfile ("/highly/sensitive/data/index.html"); } ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.registerglobals"> <title>Using Register Globals</title> <para> Perhaps the most controversial change in PHP is when the default value for the PHP directive <link linkend="ini.register-globals"> register_globals</link> went from ON to OFF in PHP <ulink url="&url.php.release4.2.0;">4.2.0</ulink>. Reliance on this directive was quite common and many people didn't even know it existed and assumed it's just how PHP works. This page will explain how one can write insecure code with this directive but keep in mind that the directive itself isn't insecure but rather it's the misuse of it. </para> <para> When on, register_globals will inject (poison) your scripts will all sorts of variables, like request variables from HTML forms. This coupled with the fact that PHP doesn't require variable initialization means writing insecure code is that much easier. It was a difficult decision, but the PHP community decided to disable this directive by default. When on, people use variables yet really don't know for sure where they come from and can only assume. Internal variables that are defined in the script itself get mixed up with request data sent by users and disabling register_globals changes this. Let's demonstrate with an example misuse of register_globals: </para> <para> <example> <title>Example misuse with register_globals = on</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // define $authorized = true only if user is authenticated if (authenticated_user()) { $authorized = true; } // Because we didn't first initialize $authorized as false, this might be // defined through register_globals, like from GET auth.php?authorized=1 // So, anyone can be seen as authenticated! if ($authorized) { include "/highly/sensitive/data.php"; } ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> When register_globals = on, our logic above may be compromised. When off, <varname>$authorized</varname> can't be set via request so it'll be fine, although it really is generally a good programming practice to initialize variables first. For example, in our example above we might have first done <literal>$authorized = false</literal>. Doing this first means our above code would work with register_globals on or off as users by default would be unauthorized. </para> <para> Another example is that of <link linkend="ref.session">sessions</link>. When register_globals = on, we could also use <varname>$username</varname> in our example below but again you must realize that <varname>$username</varname> could also come from other means, such as GET (through the URL). </para> <para> <example> <title>Example use of sessions with register_globals on or off</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // We wouldn't know where $username came from but do know $_SESSION is // for session data if (isset($_SESSION['username'])) { echo "Hello <b>{$_SESSION['username']}</b>"; } else { echo "Hello <b>Guest</b><br />"; echo "Would you like to login?"; } ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> It's even possible to take preventative measures to warn when forging is being attempted. If you know ahead of time exactly where a variable should be coming from, you can check to see if the submitted data is coming from an inappropriate kind of submission. While it doesn't guarantee that data has not been forged, it does require an attacker to guess the right kind of forging. If you don't care where the request data comes from, you can use <varname>$_REQUEST</varname> as it contains a mix of GET, POST and COOKIE data. See also the manual section on using <link linkend="language.variables.external">variables from outside of PHP</link>. </para> <para> <example> <title>Detecting simple variable poisoning</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php if (isset($_COOKIE['MAGIC_COOKIE'])) { // MAGIC_COOKIE comes from a cookie. // Be sure to validate the cookie data! } elseif (isset($_GET['MAGIC_COOKIE']) || isset($_POST['MAGIC_COOKIE'])) { mail("admin@example.com", "Possible breakin attempt", $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']); echo "Security violation, admin has been alerted."; exit; } else { // MAGIC_COOKIE isn't set through this REQUEST } ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> Of course, simply turning off register_globals does not mean your code is secure. For every piece of data that is submitted, it should also be checked in other ways. Always validate your user data and initialize your variables! To check for unitialized variables you may turn up <function>error_reporting</function> to show <constant>E_NOTICE</constant> level errors. </para> ¬e.superglobals; </sect1> <sect1 id="security.variables"> <title>User Submitted Data</title> <para> The greatest weakness in many PHP programs is not inherent in the language itself, but merely an issue of code not being written with security in mind. For this reason, you should always take the time to consider the implications of a given piece of code, to ascertain the possible damage if an unexpected variable is submitted to it. <example> <title>Dangerous Variable Usage</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // remove a file from the user's home directory... or maybe // somebody else's? unlink ($evil_var); // Write logging of their access... or maybe an /etc/passwd entry? fputs ($fp, $evil_var); // Execute something trivial.. or rm -rf *? system ($evil_var); exec ($evil_var); ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> You should always carefully examine your code to make sure that any variables being submitted from a web browser are being properly checked, and ask yourself the following questions: <itemizedlist> <listitem> <simpara> Will this script only affect the intended files? </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Can unusual or undesirable data be acted upon? </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Can this script be used in unintended ways? </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Can this be used in conjunction with other scripts in a negative manner? </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Will any transactions be adequately logged? </simpara> </listitem> </itemizedlist> By adequately asking these questions while writing the script, rather than later, you prevent an unfortunate re-write when you need to increase your security. By starting out with this mindset, you won't guarantee the security of your system, but you can help improve it. </para> <para> You may also want to consider turning off register_globals, magic_quotes, or other convenience settings which may confuse you as to the validity, source, or value of a given variable. Working with PHP in error_reporting(E_ALL) mode can also help warn you about variables being used before they are checked or initialized (so you can prevent unusual data from being operated upon). </para> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.hiding"> <title>Skrývání PHP</title> <para> In general, security by obscurity is one of the weakest forms of security. But in some cases, every little bit of extra security is desirable. </para> <para> A few simple techniques can help to hide PHP, possibly slowing down an attacker who is attempting to discover weaknesses in your system. By setting expose_php = off in your &php.ini; file, you reduce the amount of information available to them. </para> <para> Another tactic is to configure web servers such as apache to parse different filetypes through PHP, either with an &htaccess; directive, or in the apache configuration file itself. You can then use misleading file extensions: <example> <title>Hiding PHP as another language</title> <programlisting role="apache-conf"> <![CDATA[ # Make PHP code look like other code types AddType application/x-httpd-php .asp .py .pl ]]> </programlisting> </example> Or obscure it completely: <example> <title>Using unknown types for PHP extensions</title> <programlisting role="apache-conf"> <![CDATA[ # Make PHP code look like unknown types AddType application/x-httpd-php .bop .foo .133t ]]> </programlisting> </example> Or hide it as HTML code, which has a slight performance hit because all HTML will be parsed through the PHP engine: <example> <title>Using HTML types for PHP extensions</title> <programlisting role="apache-conf"> <![CDATA[ # Make all PHP code look like HTML AddType application/x-httpd-php .htm .html ]]> </programlisting> </example> For this to work effectively, you must rename your PHP files with the above extensions. While it is a form of security through obscurity, it's a minor preventative measure with few drawbacks. </para> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.current"> <title>Keeping Current</title> <simpara> PHP, like any other large system, is under constant scrutiny and improvement. Each new version will often include both major and minor changes to enhance and repair security flaws, configuration mishaps, and other issues that will affect the overall security and stability of your system. </simpara> <simpara> Like other system-level scripting languages and programs, the best approach is to update often, and maintain awareness of the latest versions and their changes. </simpara> </sect1> </chapter> <!-- Keep this comment at the end of the file Local variables: mode: sgml sgml-omittag:t sgml-shorttag:t sgml-minimize-attributes:nil sgml-always-quote-attributes:t sgml-indent-step:1 sgml-indent-data:t indent-tabs-mode:nil sgml-parent-document:nil sgml-default-dtd-file:"../manual.ced" sgml-exposed-tags:nil sgml-local-catalogs:nil sgml-local-ecat-files:nil End: -->
http://cvs.php.net/co.php/phpdoc-cs/security/index.xml?r=1.1&p=1 Index: phpdoc-cs/security/index.xml +++ phpdoc-cs/security/index.xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-2"?> <!-- EN-Revision: 1.66 Maintainer: luk Status: mixed --> <chapter id="security.index"> <title>Bezpeènost</title> <simpara> PHP je výkonný jazyk a interpret, a» ji¾ vlo¾ený do WWW serveru jako modul èi spou¹tìný zvlá¹t jako <acronym>CGI</acronym> aplikace, a mù¾e pøistupovat k souborùm, provádìt systémové pøíkazy a otvírat na serveru sítová spojení. Tyto vlastnosti èiní jakýkoli bìh PHP na webovském serveru implicitnì nebezpeèným. PHP je navr¾eno jako jazyk, který by mìl být pro psaní CGI programù bezpeènìj¹í ne¾ Perl nebo C, a se správnou volbou kompilaèních a bìhových nastavení, souèasnì se správnými praktikami kódování, mù¾e poskytnout pøesnì takovou kombinaci svobody a bezpeènosti, jakou potøebujete. </simpara> <simpara> Proto¾e existuje mnoho rùzných zpùsobù pou¾ití PHP, je také mnoho konfiguraèních nastavení ovládajících jeho chování. ©iroká ¹kála nastavení zaruèuje, ¾e mù¾ete PHP pou¾ívat k mnoha úèelùm, ale také to znamená, ¾e jsou kombinace tìchto voleb a konfigurace serveru, které vedou k nebezpeènému nastavení. </simpara> <simpara> Konfiguraèní flexibilita PHP rovnocennì soupeøí s flexibilitou kódu. PHP lze pou¾ít na vybudování kompletních serverových aplikací s plnou silou klasického ("shellového") u¾ivatele, ale stejnì tak i pro jednoduché serverové skripty s malým rizikem v "se¹nìrovaném" prostøedí. Jak vybudujete takové prostøedí, a jak bude bezpeèné, je pøedev¹ím zále¾itostí vývojáøe v PHP. </simpara> <simpara> Tato kapitola zaèíná nìkterými obecnými bezpeènostními radami, vysvìtluje rùzné kombinace konfiguraèních voleb a situace, kdy mohou být bezpeènì pou¾ity, a popisuje rùzné úvahy o kódování pro rùzné úrovnì bezpeènosti. </simpara> <sect1 id="security.general"> <title>Obecné úvahy</title> <simpara> Naprosto bezpeèný systém je pouhý sen, tak¾e jako pøiblí¾ení se v oblasti bezpeènosti volí urèitý kompromis mezi bezpeèím a pou¾itelností. Pokud ka¾dá promìnná odesílaná u¾ivatelem vy¾aduje dva zpùsoby biometrické validace (napø. obraz oèní sítnice a a otisk prstu), mù¾ete získat extrémnì vysokou úroveò zabezpeèení. Ale také znamenat, ¾e vyplnìní bì¾ného formuláøe bude trvat pùl hodiny, a proto to povede k tomu, ¾e u¾ivatelé budou hledat zpùsoby, jak zabezpeèení obejít. </simpara> <simpara> Nejlep¹í bezpeènost je èasto dost nevtíravá na to, aby vyhovìla po¾adavkùm, bez bránìní u¾ivatelùm v práci nebo pøetì¾ování autora kódu nadmìrnou slo¾itostí. Vìru, nìkteré bezpeènostní útoky jsou pouze prolomení tohoto druhu pøehnanì stavìné bezpeènosti, která bìhem èasu povoluje. Indeed, some security attacks are merely exploits of this kind of overly built security, which tends to erode over time. </simpara> <simpara> Fráze hodná zapamatování: Systém je jen tak dobrý, jako jeho nejslab¹í èlánek. Pokud jsou v¹echny transakce pøesnì zaznamenávány (na základì èasu, místa, typu transakce atd.), ale u¾ivatel je ovìøován pouze na základì jednoduché "su¹enky" (cookie), vazba mezi u¾ivateli a záznamem transakcí je podstatnì oslabena. </simpara> <simpara> Pøi testování mìjte na pamìti, ¾e nebudete schopni otestovat v¹echny mo¾nosti ani pro nejjednodu¹¹í stránky. Vstupy, které mù¾ete oèekávát, nebudou mít absolutnì nic spoleèného se vstupy zadávanými nespokojeným zamìstnancem, crackerem s mìsíci èasu k dispozici nebo koèkou domácí pochodující pøes klávesnici. To je dùvod, proè je nejlep¹í se dívat na kód z logické perspektivy, ke zji¹tìní, kde se mohou objevit neoèekávaná data, a potom kde mohou být následnì mìnìna, redukována nebo zesilována. </simpara> <simpara> Internet je plný lidí, kteøí si pokou¹ejí udìlat jméno prolamováním va¹eho kódu, zbouráním stránky, odesíláním nevhodných dat do systému nebo jiným "zpøíjemnìním" va¹eho dne. Nezále¾í, máte-li malý nebo velký web, jste cílem jednodu¹e tím, ¾e jste online, ¾e máte server, ke kterému se lze pøipojit. Mnoho crackovacích programù nerozli¹uje podle velikosti, jednodu¹e procházejí celé obrovské bloky IP adres a hledají obìti. Zkuste se nestát jednou z nich. </simpara> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.cgi-bin"> <title>Instalace PHP jako CGI binární aplikace</title> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.attacks"> <title>Mo¾né útoky</title> <simpara> Pou¾ívání PHP jako <acronym>CGI</acronym> aplikace je volba pro instalace, kdy si z nìjakých dùvodù nepøejete integrovat PHP jako modul do serveru (jako je Apache), nebo budete pou¾ívat PHP s rùznými druhy CGI wrapperù k vytvoøení bezpeèných prostøedí pro skripty pomocí chroot a setuid. Toto nastavení obvykle zahrnuje nainstalování PHP programu do adresáøe cgi-bin na serveru. Poradenství CERT <ulink url="&url.cert;">CA-96.11</ulink> se staví proti umís»ování jakýchkoli interpretù do cgi-bin. Pøesto kdy¾ se PHP aplikace pou¾ívá jako samostatný interpret, je PHP navr¾eno tak, aby zabránilo útokùm, které by pøi tomto pou¾ívání hrozily: </simpara> <itemizedlist> <listitem> <simpara> Pøístup k systému souborù: <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php?/etc/passwd</filename> </simpara> <simpara> Dotazová informace v URL za otazníkem (?) se pøedává jako argumenty pøíkazové øádky pøes CGI rozhraní do interpretu. Interprety obvykle otevøou a spustí soubor uvedený jako první argument pøíkazové øádky. </simpara> <simpara> Pøi zavolání jako CGI binární aplikace PHP odmítne interpretovat argumenty pøíkazové øádky. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Pøístup k jakýmkoli WWW dokumentùm na serveru: <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secret/doc.html</filename> </simpara> <simpara> Cesta obsa¾ená v URL za názvem PHP aplikace, <filename role="uri">/secret/doc.html</filename>, se standardnì pou¾ívá ke specifikaci souboru, který se má otevøít a interpretovat <acronym>CGI</acronym> programem. Obvykle se k pøesmìrování po¾adavkù na dokumenty do PHP interpretu pou¾ívají nìkteré konfiguraèní direktivy web serveru (Apache: Action), jako <filename role="url">http://my.host/secret/script.php</filename>. V tomto nastavení web server nejprve ovìøí pøístupová práva k adresáøi <filename role="uri">/secret</filename>, a potom vytvoøí pøesmìrovaný po¾adavek <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secret/script.php</filename>. Bohu¾el, je-li pùvodní po¾adavek zadán v této formì, ¾ádná ovìøení práv web serverem pro soubor <filename role="uri">/secret/script.php</filename> se nekonají, ovìøuje se pouze soubor <filename role="uri">/cgi-bin/php</filename>. Tento zpùsob umo¾òuje libovolnému u¾ivateli, který má pøístup k <filename role="uri">/cgi-bin/php</filename>, pøistupovat ke kterémukoli chránìnému dokumentu na serveru. </simpara> <simpara> V PHP lze k prevenci proti tomuto útoku pou¾ít kompilaèní konfiguraèní volbu <link linkend="install.configure.enable-force-cgi-redirect">--enable-force-cgi-redirect</link> a bìhové konfiguraèní direktivy <link linkend="ini.doc-root">doc_root</link> a <link linkend="ini.user-dir">user_dir</link>, pokud strom dokumentù na serveru obsahuje nìjaké adresáøe s omezením pøístupu. Viz ní¾e pro kompletní vysvìtlení rùzných kombinací. </simpara> </listitem> </itemizedlist> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.default"> <title>Pøípad 1: poskytují se pouze veøejné soubory</title> <simpara> Pokud server neposkytuje ¾ádný obsah chránìný heslem nebo øízením pøístupu na bázi IP adres, není tøeba pou¾ívat tyto konfiguraèní volby. Nedovoluje-li vá¹ server provádìt pøesmìrování nebo nemá zpùsob, jak PHP programu sdìlit, ¾e je bezpeènì pøesmìrovatelný, mù¾ete do konfiguraèního skriptu specifikovat volbu <link linkend="install.configure.enable-force-cgi-redirect">--enable-force-cgi-redirect</link>. Nadále musíte zajistit, ¾e va¹e PHP skripty nespoléhají na ten èi onen zpùsob volání skriptu, jak pøímo <filename role="php">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/dir/script.php</filename>, tak pøes pøesmìrování <filename role="php">http://my.host/dir/script.php</filename>. </simpara> <simpara> Pøesmìrování lze v serveru Apache nakonfigurovat pomocí direktiv AddHandler a Action (viz ní¾e). </simpara> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.force-redirect"> <title>Pøípad 2: pou¾ití --enable-force-cgi-redirect</title> <simpara> Tato kompilaèní volba zabraòuje komukoli ve volání PHP pøímo pøes URL jako <filename role="php">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secretdir/script.php</filename>. PHP zde bude v tomto re¾imu parsovat skript pouze tehdy, pøistupovalo-li se k nìmu pøes pøesmìrovací pravidlo WWW serveru. </simpara> <simpara> Pøesmìrování se v konfiguraci Apache obvykle nastavuje následujícími direktivami: </simpara> <programlisting role="apache-conf"> <![CDATA[ Action php-script /cgi-bin/php AddHandler php-script .php ]]> </programlisting> <simpara> Tato volba byla testována pouze s web serverem Apache a spoléhá na to, ¾e Apache nastavuje nestandardní promìnnou prostøedí pro CGI na pøesmìrování po¾adavkù: <envar>REDIRECT_STATUS</envar>. Nepodporuje-li vá¹ WWW server ¾ádný zpùsob, jak øíci, zda je po¾adavek pøímý nebo pøesmìrovaný, nemù¾ete tuto volbu pou¾ívat a musíte pou¾ít jeden z dal¹ích zde zdokumnetovaných zpùsobù spou¹tìní CGI verze PHP. </simpara> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.doc-root"> <title>Pøípad 3: nastavení doc_root nebo user_dir</title> <simpara> Pøi vkládání aktivního obsahu, jako jsou skripty a programy, u web serveru nìkdy dochází k nebezpeèných praktikám. Pokud nejsou, kvùli nìjaké konfiguraèní chybì, skripty provádìny, nýbr¾ zobrazovány jako bì¾né HTML dokumenty, mù¾e dojít k úniku du¹evního vlastnictví nebo bezpeèenostních informací (napø. hesel). Proto bude mnoho správcù nastavení jiné adresáøové struktury pro skripty, ke kterých lze pøistupovat pouze pøes PHP CGI, a jsou tedy v¾dy interpretovány a nikdy zobrazovány. </simpara> <simpara> Also if the method for making sure the requests are not redirected, as described in the previous section, is not available, it is necessary to set up a script doc_root that is different from web document root. </simpara> <simpara> You can set the PHP script document root by the configuration directive <link linkend="ini.doc-root">doc_root</link> in the <link linkend="configuration.file">configuration file</link>, or you can set the environment variable <envar>PHP_DOCUMENT_ROOT</envar>. If it is set, the CGI version of PHP will always construct the file name to open with this <parameter>doc_root</parameter> and the path information in the request, so you can be sure no script is executed outside this directory (except for <parameter>user_dir</parameter> below). </simpara> <simpara> Another option usable here is <link linkend="ini.user-dir">user_dir</link>. When user_dir is unset, only thing controlling the opened file name is <parameter>doc_root</parameter>. Opening an url like <filename role="url">http://my.host/~user/doc.php</filename> does not result in opening a file under users home directory, but a file called <filename role="uri">~user/doc.php</filename> under doc_root (yes, a directory name starting with a tilde [<literal>~</literal>]). </simpara> <simpara> If user_dir is set to for example <filename role="dir">public_php</filename>, a request like <filename role="url">http://my.host/~user/doc.php</filename> will open a file called <filename>doc.php</filename> under the directory named <filename role="dir">public_php</filename> under the home directory of the user. If the home of the user is <filename role="dir">/home/user</filename>, the file executed is <filename>/home/user/public_php/doc.php</filename>. </simpara> <simpara> <parameter>user_dir</parameter> expansion happens regardless of the <parameter>doc_root</parameter> setting, so you can control the document root and user directory access separately. </simpara> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.shell"> <title>Pøípad 4: PHP parser mimo WWW strom</title> <para> A very secure option is to put the PHP parser binary somewhere outside of the web tree of files. In <filename role="dir">/usr/local/bin</filename>, for example. The only real downside to this option is that you will now have to put a line similar to: <informalexample> <programlisting> <![CDATA[ #!/usr/local/bin/php ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> as the first line of any file containing PHP tags. You will also need to make the file executable. That is, treat it exactly as you would treat any other CGI script written in Perl or sh or any other common scripting language which uses the <literal>#!</literal> shell-escape mechanism for launching itself. </para> <para> To get PHP to handle <envar>PATH_INFO</envar> and <envar>PATH_TRANSLATED</envar> information correctly with this setup, the PHP parser should be compiled with the <link linkend="install.configure.enable-discard-path">--enable-discard-path</link> configure option. </para> </sect2> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.apache"> <title>Instalace jako modulu do Apache</title> <simpara> When PHP is used as an Apache module it inherits Apache's user permissions (typically those of the "nobody" user). This has several impacts on security and authorization. For example, if you are using PHP to access a database, unless that database has built-in access control, you will have to make the database accessible to the "nobody" user. This means a malicious script could access and modify the database, even without a username and password. It's entirely possible that a web spider could stumble across a database administrator's web page, and drop all of your databases. You can protect against this with Apache authorization, or you can design your own access model using LDAP, &htaccess; files, etc. and include that code as part of your PHP scripts. </simpara> <simpara> Often, once security is established to the point where the PHP user (in this case, the apache user) has very little risk attached to it, it is discovered that PHP is now prevented from writing any files to user directories. Or perhaps it has been prevented from accessing or changing databases. It has equally been secured from writing good and bad files, or entering good and bad database transactions. </simpara> <simpara> A frequent security mistake made at this point is to allow apache root permissions, or to escalate apache's abilitites in some other way. </simpara> <simpara> Escalating the Apache user's permissions to root is extremely dangerous and may compromise the entire system, so sudo'ing, chroot'ing, or otherwise running as root should not be considered by those who are not security professionals. </simpara> <simpara> There are some simpler solutions. By using <link linkend="ini.open-basedir">open_basedir</link> you can control and restrict what directories are allowed to be used for PHP. You can also set up apache-only areas, to restrict all web based activity to non-user, or non-system, files. </simpara> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.filesystem"> <title>Bezpeènost souborového systému</title> <simpara> PHP is subject to the security built into most server systems with respect to permissions on a file and directory basis. This allows you to control which files in the filesystem may be read. Care should be taken with any files which are world readable to ensure that they are safe for reading by all users who have access to that filesystem. </simpara> <simpara> Since PHP was designed to allow user level access to the filesystem, it's entirely possible to write a PHP script that will allow you to read system files such as /etc/passwd, modify your ethernet connections, send massive printer jobs out, etc. This has some obvious implications, in that you need to ensure that the files that you read from and write to are the appropriate ones. </simpara> <simpara> Consider the following script, where a user indicates that they'd like to delete a file in their home directory. This assumes a situation where a PHP web interface is regularly used for file management, so the Apache user is allowed to delete files in the user home directories. </simpara> <para> <example> <title>Poor variable checking leads to....</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // remove a file from the user's home directory $username = $_POST['user_submitted_name']; $homedir = "/home/$username"; $file_to_delete = "$userfile"; unlink ("$homedir/$userfile"); echo "$file_to_delete has been deleted!"; ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> Since the username is postable from a user form, they can submit a username and file belonging to someone else, and delete files. In this case, you'd want to use some other form of authentication. Consider what could happen if the variables submitted were "../etc/" and "passwd". The code would then effectively read: <example> <title>... A filesystem attack</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // removes a file from anywhere on the hard drive that // the PHP user has access to. If PHP has root access: $username = "../etc/"; $homedir = "/home/../etc/"; $file_to_delete = "passwd"; unlink ("/home/../etc/passwd"); echo "/home/../etc/passwd has been deleted!"; ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> There are two important measures you should take to prevent these issues. <itemizedlist> <listitem> <simpara> Only allow limited permissions to the PHP web user binary. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Check all variables which are submitted. </simpara> </listitem> </itemizedlist> Here is an improved script: <example> <title>More secure file name checking</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // removes a file from the hard drive that // the PHP user has access to. $username = $_SERVER['REMOTE_USER']; // using an authentication mechanisim $homedir = "/home/$username"; $file_to_delete = basename("$userfile"); // strip paths unlink ($homedir/$file_to_delete); $fp = fopen("/home/logging/filedelete.log","+a"); //log the deletion $logstring = "$username $homedir $file_to_delete"; fputs ($fp, $logstring); fclose($fp); echo "$file_to_delete has been deleted!"; ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> However, even this is not without it's flaws. If your authentication system allowed users to create their own user logins, and a user chose the login "../etc/", the system is once again exposed. For this reason, you may prefer to write a more customized check: <example> <title>Bezpeènìj¹í test názvu souboru</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php $username = $_SERVER['REMOTE_USER']; // using an authentication mechanisim $homedir = "/home/$username"; if (!ereg('^[^./][^/]*$', $userfile)) die('bad filename'); //die, do not process if (!ereg('^[^./][^/]*$', $username)) die('bad username'); //die, do not process //etc... ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> Depending on your operating system, there are a wide variety of files which you should be concerned about, including device entries (/dev/ or COM1), configuration files (/etc/ files and the .ini files), well known file storage areas (/home/, My Documents), etc. For this reason, it's usually easier to create a policy where you forbid everything except for what you explicitly allow. </para> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.database"> <title>Bezpeènost databází</title> <simpara> Nowadays, databases are cardinal components of any web based application by enabling websites to provide varying dynamic content. Since very sensitive or secret information can be stored in a database, you should strongly consider protecting your databases. </simpara> <simpara> To retrieve or to store any information you need to connect to the database, send a legitimate query, fetch the result, and close the connection. Nowadays, the commonly used query language in this interaction is the Structured Query Language (SQL). See how an attacker can <link linkend="security.database.sql-injection">tamper with an SQL query</link>. </simpara> <simpara> As you can surmise, PHP cannot protect your database by itself. The following sections aim to be an introduction into the very basics of how to access and manipulate databases within PHP scripts. </simpara> <simpara> Keep in mind this simple rule: defense in depth. The more places you take action to increase the protection of your database, the less probability of an attacker succeeding in exposing or abusing any stored information. Good design of the database schema and the application deals with your greatest fears. </simpara> <sect2 id="security.database.design"> <title>Návrh databází</title> <simpara> The first step is always to create the database, unless you want to use one from a third party. When a database is created, it is assigned to an owner, who executed the creation statement. Usually, only the owner (or a superuser) can do anything with the objects in that database, and in order to allow other users to use it, privileges must be granted. </simpara> <simpara> Applications should never connect to the database as its owner or a superuser, because these users can execute any query at will, for example, modifying the schema (e.g. dropping tables) or deleting its entire content. </simpara> <simpara> You may create different database users for every aspect of your application with very limited rights to database objects. The most required privileges should be granted only, and avoid that the same user can interact with the database in different use cases. This means that if intruders gain access to your database using your applications credentials, they can only effect as many changes as your application can. </simpara> <simpara> You are encouraged not to implement all the business logic in the web application (i.e. your script), instead do it in the database schema using views, triggers or rules. If the system evolves, new ports will be intended to open to the database, and you have to re-implement the logic in each separate database client. Over and above, triggers can be used to transparently and automatically handle fields, which often provides insight when debugging problems with your application or tracing back transactions. </simpara> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.database.connection"> <title>Pøipojení na databázi</title> <simpara> You may want to estabilish the connections over SSL to encrypt client/server communications for increased security, or you can use ssh to encrypt the network connection between clients and the database server. If either of these is used, then monitoring your traffic and gaining information about your database will be difficult for a would-be attacker. </simpara> <!--simpara> If your database server has native SSL support, consider using <link linkend="ref.openssl">OpenSSL functions</link> in communication between PHP and database via SSL. </simpara--> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.database.storage"> <title>©ifrovaný model ulo¾ení dat</title> <simpara> SSL/SSH protects data travelling from the client to the server, SSL/SSH does not protect the persistent data stored in a database. SSL is an on-the-wire protocol. </simpara> <simpara> Once an attacker gains access to your database directly (bypassing the webserver), the stored sensitive data may be exposed or misused, unless the information is protected by the database itself. Encrypting the data is a good way to mitigate this threat, but very few databases offer this type of data encryption. </simpara> <simpara> The easiest way to work around this problem is to first create your own encryption package, and then use it from within your PHP scripts. PHP can assist you in this with several extensions, such as <link linkend="ref.mcrypt">Mcrypt</link> and <link linkend="ref.mhash">Mhash</link>, covering a wide variety of encryption algorithms. The script encrypts the data before inserting it into the database, and decrypts it when retrieving. See the references for further examples of how encryption works. </simpara> <simpara> In case of truly hidden data, if its raw representation is not needed (i.e. not be displayed), hashing may also be taken into consideration. The well-known example for the hashing is storing the MD5 hash of a password in a database, instead of the password itself. See also <function>crypt</function> and <function>md5</function>. </simpara> <example> <title>Using hashed password field</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ // storing password hash $query = sprintf("INSERT INTO users(name,pwd) VALUES('%s','%s');", addslashes($username), md5($password)); $result = pg_exec($connection, $query); // querying if user submitted the right password $query = sprintf("SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE name='%s' AND pwd='%s';", addslashes($username), md5($password)); $result = pg_exec($connection, $query); if (pg_numrows($result) > 0) { echo "Welcome, $username!"; } else { echo "Authentication failed for $username."; } ]]> </programlisting> </example> </sect2> <sect2 id="security.database.sql-injection"> <title>SQL Injection (vpa¹ování SQL kódu)</title> <simpara> Many web developers are unaware of how SQL queries can be tampered with, and assume that an SQL query is a trusted command. It means that SQL queries are able to circumvent access controls, thereby bypassing standard authentication and authorization checks, and sometimes SQL queries even may allow access to host operating system level commands. </simpara> <simpara> Direct SQL Command Injection is a technique where an attacker creates or alters existing SQL commands to expose hidden data, or to override valuable ones, or even to execute dangerous system level commands on the database host. This is accomplished by the application taking user input and combining it with static parameters to build a SQL query. The following examples are based on true stories, unfortunately. </simpara> <para> Owing to the lack of input validation and connecting to the database on behalf of a superuser or the one who can create users, the attacker may create a superuser in your database. <example> <title> Splitting the result set into pages ... and making superusers (PostgreSQL and MySQL) </title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $offset = argv[0]; // beware, no input validation! $query = "SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET $offset;"; // with PostgreSQL $result = pg_exec($conn, $query); // with MySQL $result = mysql_query($query); ]]> </programlisting> </example> Normal users click on the 'next', 'prev' links where the <varname>$offset</varname> is encoded into the URL. The script expects that the incoming <varname>$offset</varname> is a decimal number. However, what if someone tries to break in by appending a <function>urlencode</function>'d form of the following to the URL <informalexample> <programlisting> <![CDATA[ // in case of PostgreSQL 0; insert into pg_shadow(usename,usesysid,usesuper,usecatupd,passwd) select 'crack', usesysid, 't','t','crack' from pg_shadow where usename='postgres'; -- // in case of MySQL 0; UPDATE user SET Password=PASSWORD('crack') WHERE user='root'; FLUSH PRIVILEGES; ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> If it happened, then the script would present a superuser access to him. Note that <literal>0;</literal> is to supply a valid offset to the original query and to terminate it. </para> <note> <para> It is common technique to force the SQL parser to ignore the rest of the query written by the developer with <literal>--</literal> which is the comment sign in SQL. </para> </note> <para> A feasible way to gain passwords is to circumvent your search result pages. The only thing the attacker needs to do is to see if there are any submitted variables used in SQL statements which are not handled properly. These filters can be set commonly in a preceding form to customize <literal>WHERE, ORDER BY, LIMIT</literal> and <literal>OFFSET</literal> clauses in <literal>SELECT</literal> statements. If your database supports the <literal>UNION</literal> construct, the attacker may try to append an entire query to the original one to list passwords from an arbitrary table. Using encrypted password fields is strongly encouraged. <example> <title> Listing out articles ... and some passwords (any database server) </title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $query = "SELECT id, name, inserted, size FROM products WHERE size = '$size' ORDER BY $order LIMIT $limit, $offset;"; $result = odbc_exec($conn, $query); ]]> </programlisting> </example> The static part of the query can be combined with another <literal>SELECT</literal> statement which reveals all passwords: <informalexample> <programlisting> <![CDATA[ ' union select '1', concat(uname||'-'||passwd) as name, '1971-01-01', '0' from usertable; -- ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> If this query (playing with the <literal>'</literal> and <literal>--</literal>) were assigned to one of the variables used in <varname>$query</varname>, the query beast awakened. </para> <para> SQL UPDATE's are also susceptible to attack. These queries are also threatened by chopping and appending an entirely new query to it. But the attacker might fiddle with the <literal>SET</literal> clause. In this case some schema information must be possessed to manipulate the query successfully. This can be acquired by examining the form variable names, or just simply brute forcing. There are not so many naming conventions for fields storing passwords or usernames. <example> <title> From resetting a password ... to gaining more privileges (any database server) </title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='$pwd' WHERE uid='$uid';"; ]]> </programlisting> </example> But a malicious user sumbits the value <literal>' or uid like'%admin%'; --</literal> to <varname>$uid</varname> to change the admin's password, or simply sets <varname>$pwd</varname> to <literal>"hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 "</literal> (with a trailing space) to gain more privileges. Then, the query will be twisted: <informalexample> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ // $uid == ' or uid like'%admin%'; -- $query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='...' WHERE uid='' or uid like '%admin%'; --"; // $pwd == "hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 " $query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 WHERE ...;" ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> </para> <para> A frightening example how operating system level commands can be accessed on some database hosts. <example> <title>Attacking the database hosts operating system (MSSQL Server)</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $query = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE id LIKE '%$prod%'"; $result = mssql_query($query); ]]> </programlisting> </example> If attacker submits the value <literal>a%' exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD' --</literal> to <varname>$prod</varname>, then the <varname>$query</varname> will be: <informalexample> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ $query = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE id LIKE '%a%' exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD'--"; $result = mssql_query($query); ]]> </programlisting> </informalexample> MSSQL Server executes the SQL statements in the batch including a command to add a new user to the local accounts database. If this application were running as <literal>sa</literal> and the MSSQLSERVER service is running with sufficient privileges, the attacker would now have an account with which to access this machine. </para> <note> <para> Some of the examples above is tied to a specific database server. This does not mean that a similar attack is impossible against other products. Your database server may be similarly vulnerable in another manner. </para> </note> <sect3 id="security.database.avoiding"> <title>Techniky ochrany</title> <simpara> You may plead that the attacker must possess a piece of information about the database schema in most examples. You are right, but you never know when and how it can be taken out, and if it happens, your database may be exposed. If you are using an open source, or publicly available database handling package, which may belong to a content management system or forum, the intruders easily produce a copy of a piece of your code. It may be also a security risk if it is a poorly designed one. </simpara> <simpara> These attacks are mainly based on exploiting the code not being written with security in mind. Never trust any kind of input, especially that which comes from the client side, even though it comes from a select box, a hidden input field or a cookie. The first example shows that such a blameless query can cause disasters. </simpara> <itemizedlist> <listitem> <simpara> Nikdy se nepøipojujte na databázi jako superu¾ivatel nebo vlastník databáze. V¾dy pou¾ívejte zvlá¹tní u¾ivatele s velmi omezenými právy. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Check if the given input has the expected data type. PHP has a wide range of input validating functions, from the simplest ones found in <link linkend="ref.variables">Variable Functions</link> and in <link linkend="ref.ctype">Character Type Functions</link> (e.g. <function>is_numeric</function>, <function>ctype_digit</function> respectively) and onwards to the <link linkend="ref.pcre">Perl compatible Regular Expressions</link> support. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <para> If the application waits for numerical input, consider verifying data with <function>is_numeric</function>, or silently change its type using <function>settype</function>, or use its numeric representation by <function>sprintf</function>. <example> <title>A more secure way to compose a query for paging</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ settype($offset, 'integer'); $query = "SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET $offset;"; // please note %d in the format string, using %s would be meaningless $query = sprintf("SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET %d;", $offset); ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Quote each non numeric user input which is passed to the database with <function>addslashes</function> or <function>addcslashes</function>. See <link linkend="security.database.storage">the first example</link>. As the examples shows, quotes burnt into the static part of the query is not enough, and can be easily cracked. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Do not print out any database specific information, especially about the schema, by fair means or foul. See also <link linkend="security.errors">Error Reporting</link> and <link linkend="ref.errorfunc">Error Handling and Logging Functions</link>. </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> You may use stored procedures and previously defined cursors to abstract data access so that users do not directly access tables or views, but this solution has another impacts. </simpara> </listitem> </itemizedlist> <simpara> Besides these, you benefit from logging queries either within your script or by the database itself, if it supports logging. Obviously, the logging is unable to prevent any harmful attempt, but it can be helpful to trace back which application has been circumvented. The log is not useful by itself, but through the information it contains. More detail is generally better than less. </simpara> </sect3> </sect2> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.errors"> <title>Hlá¹ení chyb</title> <para> With PHP security, there are two sides to error reporting. One is beneficial to increasing security, the other is detrimental. </para> <para> A standard attack tactic involves profiling a system by feeding it improper data, and checking for the kinds, and contexts, of the errors which are returned. This allows the system cracker to probe for information about the server, to determine possible weaknesses. For example, if an attacker had gleaned information about a page based on a prior form submission, they may attempt to override variables, or modify them: <example> <title>Attacking Variables with a custom HTML page</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <form method="post" action="attacktarget?username=badfoo&password=badfoo"> <input type="hidden" name="username" value="badfoo" /> <input type="hidden" name="password" value="badfoo" /> </form> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> The PHP errors which are normally returned can be quite helpful to a developer who is trying to debug a script, indicating such things as the function or file that failed, the PHP file it failed in, and the line number which the failure occured in. This is all information that can be exploited. It is not uncommon for a php developer to use <function>show_source</function>, <function>highlight_string</function>, or <function>highlight_file</function> as a debugging measure, but in a live site, this can expose hidden variables, unchecked syntax, and other dangerous information. Especially dangerous is running code from known sources with built-in debugging handlers, or using common debugging techniques. If the attacker can determine what general technique you are using, they may try to brute-force a page, by sending various common debugging strings: <example> <title>Exploiting common debugging variables</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <form method="post" action="attacktarget?errors=Y&showerrors=1&debug=1"> <input type="hidden" name="errors" value="Y" /> <input type="hidden" name="showerrors" value="1" /> <input type="hidden" name="debug" value="1" /> </form> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> Regardless of the method of error handling, the ability to probe a system for errors leads to providing an attacker with more information. </para> <para> For example, the very style of a generic PHP error indicates a system is running PHP. If the attacker was looking at an .html page, and wanted to probe for the back-end (to look for known weaknesses in the system), by feeding it the wrong data they may be able to determine that a system was built with PHP. </para> <para> A function error can indicate whether a system may be running a specific database engine, or give clues as to how a web page or programmed or designed. This allows for deeper investigation into open database ports, or to look for specific bugs or weaknesses in a web page. By feeding different pieces of bad data, for example, an attacker can determine the order of authentication in a script, (from the line number errors) as well as probe for exploits that may be exploited in different locations in the script. </para> <para> A filesystem or general PHP error can indicate what permissions the webserver has, as well as the structure and organization of files on the web server. Developer written error code can aggravate this problem, leading to easy exploitation of formerly "hidden" information. </para> <para> There are three major solutions to this issue. The first is to scrutinize all functions, and attempt to compensate for the bulk of the errors. The second is to disable error reporting entirely on the running code. The third is to use PHP's custom error handling functions to create your own error handler. Depending on your security policy, you may find all three to be applicable to your situation. </para> <para> One way of catching this issue ahead of time is to make use of PHP's own <function>error_reporting</function>, to help you secure your code and find variable usage that may be dangerous. By testing your code, prior to deployment, with E_ALL, you can quickly find areas where your variables may be open to poisoning or modification in other ways. Once you are ready for deployment, by using E_NONE, you insulate your code from probing. <example> <title>Finding dangerous variables with E_ALL</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php if ($username) { // Not initialized or checked before usage $good_login = 1; } if ($good_login == 1) { // If above test fails, not initialized or checked before usage readfile ("/highly/sensitive/data/index.html"); } ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.registerglobals"> <title>Using Register Globals</title> <para> Perhaps the most controversial change in PHP is when the default value for the PHP directive <link linkend="ini.register-globals"> register_globals</link> went from ON to OFF in PHP <ulink url="&url.php.release4.2.0;">4.2.0</ulink>. Reliance on this directive was quite common and many people didn't even know it existed and assumed it's just how PHP works. This page will explain how one can write insecure code with this directive but keep in mind that the directive itself isn't insecure but rather it's the misuse of it. </para> <para> When on, register_globals will inject (poison) your scripts will all sorts of variables, like request variables from HTML forms. This coupled with the fact that PHP doesn't require variable initialization means writing insecure code is that much easier. It was a difficult decision, but the PHP community decided to disable this directive by default. When on, people use variables yet really don't know for sure where they come from and can only assume. Internal variables that are defined in the script itself get mixed up with request data sent by users and disabling register_globals changes this. Let's demonstrate with an example misuse of register_globals: </para> <para> <example> <title>Example misuse with register_globals = on</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // define $authorized = true only if user is authenticated if (authenticated_user()) { $authorized = true; } // Because we didn't first initialize $authorized as false, this might be // defined through register_globals, like from GET auth.php?authorized=1 // So, anyone can be seen as authenticated! if ($authorized) { include "/highly/sensitive/data.php"; } ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> When register_globals = on, our logic above may be compromised. When off, <varname>$authorized</varname> can't be set via request so it'll be fine, although it really is generally a good programming practice to initialize variables first. For example, in our example above we might have first done <literal>$authorized = false</literal>. Doing this first means our above code would work with register_globals on or off as users by default would be unauthorized. </para> <para> Another example is that of <link linkend="ref.session">sessions</link>. When register_globals = on, we could also use <varname>$username</varname> in our example below but again you must realize that <varname>$username</varname> could also come from other means, such as GET (through the URL). </para> <para> <example> <title>Example use of sessions with register_globals on or off</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // We wouldn't know where $username came from but do know $_SESSION is // for session data if (isset($_SESSION['username'])) { echo "Hello <b>{$_SESSION['username']}</b>"; } else { echo "Hello <b>Guest</b><br />"; echo "Would you like to login?"; } ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> It's even possible to take preventative measures to warn when forging is being attempted. If you know ahead of time exactly where a variable should be coming from, you can check to see if the submitted data is coming from an inappropriate kind of submission. While it doesn't guarantee that data has not been forged, it does require an attacker to guess the right kind of forging. If you don't care where the request data comes from, you can use <varname>$_REQUEST</varname> as it contains a mix of GET, POST and COOKIE data. See also the manual section on using <link linkend="language.variables.external">variables from outside of PHP</link>. </para> <para> <example> <title>Detecting simple variable poisoning</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php if (isset($_COOKIE['MAGIC_COOKIE'])) { // MAGIC_COOKIE comes from a cookie. // Be sure to validate the cookie data! } elseif (isset($_GET['MAGIC_COOKIE']) || isset($_POST['MAGIC_COOKIE'])) { mail("admin@example.com", "Possible breakin attempt", $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']); echo "Security violation, admin has been alerted."; exit; } else { // MAGIC_COOKIE isn't set through this REQUEST } ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> </para> <para> Of course, simply turning off register_globals does not mean your code is secure. For every piece of data that is submitted, it should also be checked in other ways. Always validate your user data and initialize your variables! To check for unitialized variables you may turn up <function>error_reporting</function> to show <constant>E_NOTICE</constant> level errors. </para> ¬e.superglobals; </sect1> <sect1 id="security.variables"> <title>User Submitted Data</title> <para> The greatest weakness in many PHP programs is not inherent in the language itself, but merely an issue of code not being written with security in mind. For this reason, you should always take the time to consider the implications of a given piece of code, to ascertain the possible damage if an unexpected variable is submitted to it. <example> <title>Dangerous Variable Usage</title> <programlisting role="php"> <![CDATA[ <?php // remove a file from the user's home directory... or maybe // somebody else's? unlink ($evil_var); // Write logging of their access... or maybe an /etc/passwd entry? fputs ($fp, $evil_var); // Execute something trivial.. or rm -rf *? system ($evil_var); exec ($evil_var); ?> ]]> </programlisting> </example> You should always carefully examine your code to make sure that any variables being submitted from a web browser are being properly checked, and ask yourself the following questions: <itemizedlist> <listitem> <simpara> Will this script only affect the intended files? </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Can unusual or undesirable data be acted upon? </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Can this script be used in unintended ways? </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Can this be used in conjunction with other scripts in a negative manner? </simpara> </listitem> <listitem> <simpara> Will any transactions be adequately logged? </simpara> </listitem> </itemizedlist> By adequately asking these questions while writing the script, rather than later, you prevent an unfortunate re-write when you need to increase your security. By starting out with this mindset, you won't guarantee the security of your system, but you can help improve it. </para> <para> You may also want to consider turning off register_globals, magic_quotes, or other convenience settings which may confuse you as to the validity, source, or value of a given variable. Working with PHP in error_reporting(E_ALL) mode can also help warn you about variables being used before they are checked or initialized (so you can prevent unusual data from being operated upon). </para> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.hiding"> <title>Skrývání PHP</title> <para> In general, security by obscurity is one of the weakest forms of security. But in some cases, every little bit of extra security is desirable. </para> <para> A few simple techniques can help to hide PHP, possibly slowing down an attacker who is attempting to discover weaknesses in your system. By setting expose_php = off in your &php.ini; file, you reduce the amount of information available to them. </para> <para> Another tactic is to configure web servers such as apache to parse different filetypes through PHP, either with an &htaccess; directive, or in the apache configuration file itself. You can then use misleading file extensions: <example> <title>Hiding PHP as another language</title> <programlisting role="apache-conf"> <![CDATA[ # Make PHP code look like other code types AddType application/x-httpd-php .asp .py .pl ]]> </programlisting> </example> Or obscure it completely: <example> <title>Using unknown types for PHP extensions</title> <programlisting role="apache-conf"> <![CDATA[ # Make PHP code look like unknown types AddType application/x-httpd-php .bop .foo .133t ]]> </programlisting> </example> Or hide it as HTML code, which has a slight performance hit because all HTML will be parsed through the PHP engine: <example> <title>Using HTML types for PHP extensions</title> <programlisting role="apache-conf"> <![CDATA[ # Make all PHP code look like HTML AddType application/x-httpd-php .htm .html ]]> </programlisting> </example> For this to work effectively, you must rename your PHP files with the above extensions. While it is a form of security through obscurity, it's a minor preventative measure with few drawbacks. </para> </sect1> <sect1 id="security.current"> <title>Keeping Current</title> <simpara> PHP, like any other large system, is under constant scrutiny and improvement. Each new version will often include both major and minor changes to enhance and repair security flaws, configuration mishaps, and other issues that will affect the overall security and stability of your system. </simpara> <simpara> Like other system-level scripting languages and programs, the best approach is to update often, and maintain awareness of the latest versions and their changes. </simpara> </sect1> </chapter> <!-- Keep this comment at the end of the file Local variables: mode: sgml sgml-omittag:t sgml-shorttag:t sgml-minimize-attributes:nil sgml-always-quote-attributes:t sgml-indent-step:1 sgml-indent-data:t indent-tabs-mode:nil sgml-parent-document:nil sgml-default-dtd-file:"../manual.ced" sgml-exposed-tags:nil sgml-local-catalogs:nil sgml-local-ecat-files:nil End: -->