svn: /phpdoc/en/trunk/reference/mongo/ security.xml
| From: | Kristina Chodorow | Date: | Mon, 23 May 2011 20:07:43 +0000 |
| Subject: | svn: /phpdoc/en/trunk/reference/mongo/ security.xml | ||
| Groups: | php.doc.cvs | ||
| Request: | Send a blank email to doc-cvs+get-8168@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
kristina Mon, 23 May 2011 20:07:43 +0000
Revision: http://svn.php.net/viewvc?view=revision&revision=311361
Log:
added scripting injection section
Changed paths:
U phpdoc/en/trunk/reference/mongo/security.xml
Modified: phpdoc/en/trunk/reference/mongo/security.xml
===================================================================
--- phpdoc/en/trunk/reference/mongo/security.xml 2011-05-23 20:07:22 UTC (rev 311360)
+++ phpdoc/en/trunk/reference/mongo/security.xml 2011-05-23 20:07:43 UTC (rev 311361)
@@ -7,21 +7,21 @@
<section>
<title>Request Injection Attacks</title>
<para>
- If you are passing <literal>$_GET</literal> parameters to your queries, make
- sure that they are cast to strings first. Users can insert associative
+ If you are passing <literal>$_GET</literal> parameters to your queries, make
+ sure that they are cast to strings first. Users can insert associative
arrays in GET requests, which could then become unwanted $-queries.
</para>
<para>
A fairly innocuous example: suppose you are looking up a user's information
- with the request <emphasis>http://www.example.com?username=bob</emphasis>.
- Your application does the query
- <literal>$collection->find(array("username" =>
$_GET['username']))</literal>.
+ with the request <emphasis>http://www.example.com?username=bob</emphasis>.
+ Your application does the query
+ <literal>$collection->find(array("username" =>
$_GET['username']))</literal>.
</para>
<para>
- Someone could subvert this by getting
- <emphasis>http://www.example.com?username[$ne]=foo</emphasis>,
which PHP
+ Someone could subvert this by getting
+ <emphasis>http://www.example.com?username[$ne]=foo</emphasis>,
which PHP
will magically turn into an associative array, turning your query into
<literal>$collection->find(array("username" => array('$ne' =>
"foo")))</literal>,
which will return all users not named "foo" (all of your users, probably).
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
</para>
<para>
+ Note that this type of attack can be used with any databases interation that
+ locates a document, including updates, upserts, find-and-modifies, and
+ removes.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
Thanks to <link xlink:href="&url.mongodb.injection;">Phil</link> for
pointing this out.
</para>
@@ -43,6 +49,100 @@
</para>
</section>
+ <section>
+ <title>Script Injection Attacks</title>
+ <para>
+ If you are using JavaScript, make sure that any variables that cross the PHP-
+ to-JavaScript boundry are passed in the <literal>scope</literal> field of
+ <classname>MongoCode</classname>, not interpolated into the JavaScript
+ string. This can come up when using <function>MongoDB::execute</function>,
+ <literal>$where</literal> clauses, MapReduces, group-bys, and any other time
+ you may pass JavaScript into the database.
+ </para>
+ <note>
+ <para>
+ MapReduce ignore the <literal>scope</literal> field of
+ <classname>MongoCode</classname>, but there is a
<literal>scope</literal>
+ option on the command that can be used instead.
+ </para>
+ </note>
+ <para>
+ For example, suppose we have some JavaScript to greet a user in the database
+ logs. We could do:
+ </para>
+ <programlisting role="php">
+<![CDATA[
+<?php
+
+// don't do this!
+
+$username = $_POST['username'];
+$db->execute("print('Hello, $username!');");
+
+?>
+]]>
+ </programlisting>
+ <para>
+ However, what if a malicious user passes in some JavaScript?
+ </para>
+ <programlisting role="php">
+<![CDATA[
+<?php
+
+// don't do this!
+
+// $username is set to "'); db.users.drop(); print('"
+$db->execute("print('Hello, $username!');");
+
+?>
+]]>
+ </programlisting>
+ <para>
+ Now MongoDB executes the JavaScript string
+ <literal>"print('Hello, '); db.users.drop();
print('!');"</literal>.
+ This attack is easy to avoid: use <literal>scope</literal> to pass
+ variables from PHP to JavaScript:
+ </para>
+ <programlisting role="php">
+<![CDATA[
+<?php
+
+$scope = array("user" => $username);
+$db->execute(new MongoCode("print('Hello, user!');", $scope));
+
+?>
+]]>
+ </programlisting>
+ <para>
+ This adds a variable <literal>user</literal> to the JavaScript scope. Now if
+ someone tries to send malicious code, MongoDB will harmlessly print
+ <literal>Hello, '); db.dropDatabase(); print('!</literal>.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Using <literal>scope</literal> helps prevent malicious input from being
+ executed by the database. However, you must make sure that your code does
+ not turn around and execute the input anyway! For example, never use the
+ JavaScript <literal>eval</literal> function on user input:
+ </para>
+ <programlisting>
+<![CDATA[
+<?php
+
+// don't do this!
+
+// $jsShellInput is "db.users.drop();"
+$scope = array("input" => $jsShellInput);
+$db->execute(new MongoCode("eval(input);", $scope));
+
+?>
+]]>
+ </programlisting>
+ <para>
+ Always use <literal>scope</literal> and never allow the database to execute
+ user input as code.
+ </para>
+ </section>
</section>
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