RE: [PHP] Security of PHP code

From: Date: Thu, 05 Jul 2001 16:06:10 +0000
Subject: RE: [PHP] Security of PHP code
Groups: php.general 
Request: Send a blank email to php-general+get-56327@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message
An observation: I presume (in my code) that $allowed_path is a "root" of an allowed path. So, files in subfolders of allowed_path are also allowed. > -----Original Message----- > From: Christopher Ostmo [mailto:tech@appideas.com] > Sent: 5 iulie 2001 19:57 > To: Adrian Ciutureanu > Cc: php-general@lists.php.net > Subject: RE: [PHP] Security of PHP code > > > Adrian Ciutureanu pressed the little lettered thingies in > this order... > > > $allowed_path = '/www/sites/mysite/teaching'; > > $file = realpath($file); > > if(ereg("^$allowed_path", $file)) { > > // it's OK > > } else { > > // possible attack! > > } > > > > This is not good code. > > A user could replace the $file in the URL with this: > /www/sites/mysite/teaching/../../../../etc/passwd > Since it starts with $allowed_path, your code has just been fooled. > > The basic problem that I have seen with posts to this thread > is the fact > that many people do not understand how Unix servers address and/or > secure files. If what I have written above doesn't make any sense, > please go and pick up a book that covers Unix/Linux security. If you > don't, you are inviting a security breach. You may or may > not be aware > of this, but many hackers know Unix, it's security and it's common > vulnerabilities VERY well and they WILL exploit your code if it is > exploitable. > > Simply checking to see if a particular path exists in the URL will > NEVER secure this issue. > > Here's the script that I use: > > <? > require("common.php"); > $f = ereg_replace("/","",$f); > commonHeader("$f Source Code"); > ?> > <table border="1" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="0" > bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> > <tr><td> > <? > show_source("./calendar/$f"); > ?> > </td></tr> > </table> > <? > commonFooter(); > ?> > > I explicitly declare the path and I delete all forward > slashes. This means > that if someone tries to send: > $f=calendar/../../../.../../../../etc/passwd > They instead send: > $f=calendar...............etcpasswd > And the server interprets this as: > ./calendar/calendar...............etcpasswd > > The bottom line is that no files outside of the intended > directory will ever > be viewable through this script, regardless of how clever, smart or > devious the user might be. > > I could have gotten a little more fancy and given warnings if > there were > forward slashes, but the point is this: If you are allowing > real file names > to be passed as the parameter, you HAVE to do one of two things: > 1) Strip or otherwise block forward slashes and/or > consecutive periods. > 2) Declare the file path before the show_source() call and disallow > consecutive periods (".."), forward slashes or both. This is > the method > used at slashdot. > > Christopher Ostmo > a.k.a. tech@AppIdeas.com > AppIdeas.com > Innovative Application Ideas > Meeting cutting edge dynamic > web site needs since the > dawn of Internet time (1995) > > For a good time, > http://www.AppIdeas.com/ >

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