[php-src] PR #22223: Reject negative request_parse_body() limit options
| From: | OracleNep | Date: | Thu, 04 Jun 2026 04:42:52 +0000 |
| Subject: | [php-src] PR #22223: Reject negative request_parse_body() limit options | ||
| Groups: | php.git-pulls | ||
| Request: | Send a blank email to git-pulls+get-36292@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
Pull Request: https://github.com/php/php-src/pull/22223
Author: OracleNep
request_parse_body() currently accepts negative values for limit-related options.
This can weaken or bypass request body limits. In particular, for
application/x-www-form-urlencoded bodies, max_input_vars is read into an
unsigned uint64_t, so passing max_input_vars => -1 effectively turns
the limit into a very large value.
post_max_size => -1 also disables the size check, because the check only runs when
the configured value is greater than zero.
This patch rejects negative values for:
```text
max_file_uploads
max_input_vars
post_max_size
upload_max_filesize
```
max_multipart_body_parts is left unchanged because negative values currently have a
special meaning there: derive the multipart body part limit from max_input_vars +
max_file_uploads.
This is a hardening / validation fix, not a security report. The options are supplied by application
code, but accepting negative values makes it easy to accidentally disable request body limits.
### Local verification
Using php-src master be41c36b68f, tested with the built-in web server:
```text
request_parse_body(['max_input_vars' => -1])
```
accepted all urlencoded fields, while:
```text
request_parse_body(['max_input_vars' => 1])
```
triggered the expected max-input-vars warning path.
Also verified:
```text
request_parse_body(['post_max_size' => -1])
```
accepted a body that was rejected when post_max_size => 1.
### Tests
```bash
sapi/cli/php run-tests.php ext/standard/tests/http/request_parse_body/options_negative_values.phpt
sapi/cli/php run-tests.php ext/standard/tests/http/request_parse_body
```