[php-src] PR #22266: fix oob read on malformed length field in dba flatfile handler

From: Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 05:45:48 +0000
Subject: [php-src] PR #22266: fix oob read on malformed length field in dba flatfile handler
Groups: php.git-pulls 
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Pull Request: https://github.com/php/php-src/pull/22266 Author: alhudz A flatfile opened read-only parses an attacker-controlled record length, and a negative value overruns the read buffer. 1. num is a size_t but is assigned from atoi(buf), so a length line of -1 becomes SIZE_MAX. 2. the grow step then does buf_size = num + FLATFILE_BLOCK_SIZE, which wraps to a tiny value and erealloc shrinks buf. 3. php_stream_read(dba->fp, buf, num) then reads the rest of the file (num is still SIZE_MAX) into the small buffer. repro: file_put_contents('x', "-1\n" . str_repeat('A', 200000)); $db = dba_open('x', 'r', 'flatfile'); dba_firstkey($db); expected: bool(false) actual: zend_mm_heap corrupted (SIGABRT) Reachable from dba_firstkey/dba_nextkey/dba_fetch/dba_exists/dba_delete. The same idiom is repeated in flatfile_delete, flatfile_findkey, flatfile_firstkey and flatfile_nextkey, so the guard goes in each. Added a regression test.

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