Re: RFC: Increasing the default BCrypt cost
| From: | steve at tobtu dot com | Date: | Thu, 05 Oct 2023 00:18:33 +0000 |
| Subject: | Re: RFC: Increasing the default BCrypt cost | ||
| References: | 1 2 | Groups: | php.internals |
| Request: | Send a blank email to internals+get-121228@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
> On 09/07/2023 4:37 PM CDT Craig Francis <craig@craigfrancis.co.uk> wrote:
>
> We recently discussed hashing and costs at one of our OWASP meetings, we came to conclusion
> that the default of 10 for bcrypt probably should be increased, but only to 11 for typical websites.
> The main concern was about making denial-of-service attacks easier (think of a normal website
> developer, who won't limit the number of login attempts).
>
I fought long and hard to get bcrypt down from cost 12 to only cost 10 even though cost 9 was over
powered vs the other settings. At the time cost "8.1" was equivalent to the other
settings. After the recent settings increase of the others, cost "8.7" is equivalent.
Currently all of the OWASP settings come directly from me except bcrypt. The only way I was able to
get it down to cost 10 was giving equivalent settings to cost 12 for the other algorithms. Just to
show that those numbers were obviously too high. Note that bcrypt cost 12 is currently as strong as
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with ~6,000,000 iterations. Which is an insane number for web auth.
Anyway I don't look forward to arguing with OWASP to keep bcrypt at cost 10. Even though
it's currently 2.5x stronger than the other accepted settings.