Re: Yet another fix for max_input_vars
| From: | Etienne Kneuss | Date: | Thu, 05 Jan 2012 13:12:58 +0000 |
| Subject: | Re: Yet another fix for max_input_vars | ||
| References: | 1 2 | Groups: | php.internals |
| Request: | Send a blank email to internals+get-57239@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
Hi,
On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 13:05, Nikita Popov <nikita.ppv@googlemail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 9:53 AM, Laruence <laruence@php.net> wrote:
>> Hi:
>> the origin thread is too long, so I open a new thread for this.
>>
>> I have made another patch try to fix this issue.
>>
>> the key point is, randomizing the table size(tableMask).
>>
>> instead of double the the table size in zend_hash_do_resize, I
>> increase the table size with a random delta ( the value now is just a
>> try, we can change it to a more appropriate value),
>> that is: new_table_size = old_table_size * 2 + random_num.
>>
>> then, the collision can not be predicatible, which fix the
>> problem, and also fixed the issue in json/soap/serialize etc.
>>
>> here is the patch(draft now):
>>
>> https://bugs.php.net/patch-display.php?bug_id=60655&patch=rand_hash_resize.patch&revision=latest
>>
>> after this fix , may slow down the php, but compared to the
>> security threat I thinks the cost could be ignored.
>>
>> for the test script list in
>>
>> http://nikic.github.com/2011/12/28/Supercolliding-a-PHP-array.html:
>>
>> *before patched:
>> Inserting 65536 evil elements took 162.65940284729 seconds
>> Inserting 65536 good elements took 0.075557947158813 seconds
>>
>> *after patched:
>> Inserting 65536 evil elements took 0.074128866195679 seconds
>> Inserting 65536 good elements took 0.091044902801514 seconds
>>
>> what do you think ?
>
> At least one problem with your patch is that it uses crypto safe
> random numbers. The problem with that is that the very frequent random
> number fetches could deplete the entropy pool and thus make
> /dev/urandom (and probably the Windows RNG too) block. So you would
> again have a DOS vulnerability (just create many small arrays with 16
> elements so they get resized a few times). Additionally this could
> also impose a security threat to other application that rely on the
> entropy source.
In essence there should only be the need for one random number per
request, so it should be fine in that regard.
>
> Nikita
>
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--
Etienne Kneuss
http://www.colder.ch