Re: [VOTE] TLS Peer Verification

I've been asked to extend the voting period by a week because: holidays. So instead of Dec. 24 the voting period will now end on Dec. 31. On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 7:08 AM, Daniel Lowrey <rdlowrey@gmail.com> wrote: > > given that this is a security related change, one could argue that > security > > fixes should be ok to go in a minor version, even if they break BC. > > This was my thought process. In my mind the RFC is about improving > security for users who don't know any better. I'm hoping to avoid the "Are > we allowed to break BC?" discussion. > > Adding a CA file to the distribution is exceedingly simple, but this is > not a silver bullet. For example, the Mozilla CA file used by cURL is > usually updated three or four times a year. Even when bundling a CA file it > would only be a matter of time before a distribution's version was out of > date. In the end we can only do so much before users must bear the weight > of maintaining an acceptable level of security themselves. > > > > > On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 5:58 AM, Ferenc Kovacs <tyra3l@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Joe Watkins <krakjoe@php.net> wrote: >> >>> On 12/17/2013 02:03 AM, Daniel Lowrey wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks for the input -- I'm just happy people are interested in the >>>> issue! >>>> >>>> Let me address a couple of things ... >>>> >>>> you get essentially a configuration that can not use https at all >>>>> >>>> >>>> I wouldn't say this is the really the case. Users still have access to >>>> the >>>> same https functionality they've always had. The only difference is that >>>> they now must explicitly acknowledge that, "Yes, what I'm doing is >>>> insecure. I'm aware of it and I choose to continue anyway by specifying >>>> this context option." >>>> >>>> But it may be against the spirit of the RFC? >>>>> >>>> >>>> :) Yes ... that's kind of what I'm going for. Basically it's my >>>> thought >>>> that many (most?) people using things like >>>> file_get_contents('https:// >>>> ') >>>> are completely unaware of this issue in the first place. My thinking >>>> here >>>> is that instead of not saying anything and just giving these users a >>>> false >>>> sense of security we should at least make mention of the problem >>>> instead of >>>> sweeping it under the rug. >>>> >>>> people would still ignore it >>>>> >>>> >>>> Almost certainly. In fact, users do this routinely with curl_* because >>>> they >>>> don't know any better. >>>> >>>> Finally, I think this problem can largely be alleviated with appropriate >>>> documentation. Should the RFC pass I'll work to make sure that any peer >>>> verification changes are *well-documented* to (hopefully) stem the >>>> inevitable storm of bug reports. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 8:42 PM, Stas Malyshev <smalyshev@sugarcrm.com >>>> >wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi! >>>>> >>>>> Please throw your votes at the TLS Peer Verification proposal: >>>>>> >>>>>> https://wiki.php.net/rfc/tls-peer-verification�Y�q� >>>>>> N�簉�/ >>>>>> >>>>>> Voting closes Dec. 24 ... Happy Holidays! >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I'm not sure what to vote for here, because I like the ideas in the >>>>> patch about having a setting for CAfile, which in many distros would by >>>>> default enable peer verification and thus make you more secure, but I >>>>> don't like the fact that when you compile PHP, you get essentially a >>>>> configuration that can not use https at all, since you have no CA file >>>>> configured. >>>>> I'd like it more if there was an option where if you set cafile or >>>>> capath, you get automatic peer verification, but if you don't, you do >>>>> not have it. But it may be against the spirit of the RFC? >>>>> I know you propose a warning in this case, but judging from the story >>>>> of >>>>> the datetime timezone warning, people would still ignore it. Also >>>>> warning is not much help if for some reason you don't know where to get >>>>> a cert file. And there's no way to disable peer verification on ini >>>>> level. >>>>> -- >>>>> Stanislav Malyshev, Software Architect >>>>> SugarCRM: http://www.sugarcrm.com/ >>>>> (408)454-6900 ext. 227 >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> Morning Internalz, >>> >>> Daniel, you have to assume that nobody will even read the >>> manual; because they will not. I'm up for making it safer, but not for >>> breaking anything at all in a minor version, if we do not bundle the CA >>> file it would appear to break a bunch of requests that previously worked, >>> that doesn't seem good enough to me. >>> We can change the behaviour of the engine, but we cannot change >>> the behaviour of users code; if a requests works now, regardless of it's >>> security, it must continue to work with the default settings, therefore, I >>> suggest that you remove the option to change the behaviour of the engine >>> without maintaining the behaviour of users code, if the aim is to make >>> these requests more secure by default, then allowing it to fail, by any >>> means, defeats the object of making any changes at all. >>> >>> If I'm wrong, tell me how :) >>> >>> Cheers >>> Joe >>> >>> >>> -- >>> PHP Internals - PHP Runtime Development Mailing List >>> To unsubscribe, visit: http://www.php.net/unsub.php >>> >>> >> I'm not taking sides, but given that this is a security related change, >> one could argue that security fixes should be ok to go in a minor version, >> even if they break BC. >> >> -- >> Ferenc Kovács >> @Tyr43l - http://tyrael.hu >> > >