Re: [RFC] Timing attack safe string comparison function
| From: | Rouven Weßling | Date: | Mon, 23 Dec 2013 16:46:14 +0000 |
| Subject: | Re: [RFC] Timing attack safe string comparison function | ||
| References: | 1 2 3 4 5 | Groups: | php.internals |
| Request: | Send a blank email to internals+get-70864@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
Hi Marco.
On 23.12.2013, at 12:04, Marco Pivetta <ocramius@gmail.com> wrote:
> I was wondering why such an API must be implemented in PHP core (which means C, which means
> that the usual 15~20 people can fix it if borked, which is bad) and cannot be just left in userland
> as it already happens, for example, with
> https://github.com/zendframework/zf2/blob/master/library/Zend/Crypt/Utils.php#L17-L44
> and similar libraries that have some decent security policies themselves (nothing to say about PHP -
> you guys are doing great!).
>
> Why do we need this in core?
> Why can't a user copy-paste those rows (if it's a monkey-patcher) or just use a
> library?
Obviously this doesn't have to be in core, but there are a number of advantages:
* Increased awareness
* Robuster implementation since it's in a lower level language (see Stas' E-Mail earlier)
* Wider security review
For example the linked Zend example has a small issue because it actually leaks length information.
That's unimportant if one is comparing a hash (they usually have a constant length) but for
other applications it might be an issue.
Also the simple fact that basically everyone (Joomla, Zend, Symfony2) ships some function for this,
shows that there's a high demand for this functionality. Why not provide it out of the box?
> Don't get me wrong: I am all for security, but I don't see a difference between a
> php-core implementation and a userland implementation.
The hope is, like with the password hashing function, that by making it easier to use best
practices, coders will follow them.
On 23.12.2013, at 12:25, Marco Pivetta <ocramius@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 23 December 2013 12:16, Joe Watkins <krakjoe@php.net> wrote:
>
>> 291 /* We're using this method instead of == in order to provide
>> 292 * resistence towards timing attacks. This is a constant time
>> 293 * equality check that will always check every byte of both
>> 294 * values. */
>> 295 for (i = 0; i < hash_len; i++) {
>> 296 status |= (ret[i] ^ hash[i]);
>> 297 }
>>
>> So that puts in perspective the what if it borks argument, and the
>> complication argument too, since the new function and old can share a
>> static inline implementation of the same logic ... do you really want me to
>> explain why static inline c is better than PHP, or is that obvious at this
>> point ??
>
> The performance question is irrelevant to me - I don't think I'd ever code
> a performance-sensitive API with this sort of function, but maybe someone
> has a real world example for that. Slower is probably even better here :P
>
> Let me re-state: "performance is not a problem here".
Indeed, this is not a function where performance is critical and it will likely be so rarely called
even by its heaviest users that the difference of C vs PHP won't even make a dent in resource
usage.
I've updated the patch with Tjerk's suggestion and renamed the function to hash_compare.
I've also updated the RFC accordingly.
Best regards
Rouven