RE: [PHP-DEV] [VOTE] Secure Session Module Options/Internal by Default

From: Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 11:46:05 +0000
Subject: RE: [PHP-DEV] [VOTE] Secure Session Module Options/Internal by Default
References: 1  Groups: php.internals 
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Yasuo, This was previously discussed but I have to agree with Andrey (and maybe even go beyond what he said) - the hash_bits change doesn't belong in this RFC. First, it has no security implications and it's not entirely clear from the RFC. Second, I don't feel that the implications of that change are clear, beyond some mention that "this could not be an issue for almost all apps", which personally I don't think is accurate - but either way, we need some better analysis here. From my point of view I don't think a few extra characters per session going over the wire are worth the potential obscure BC break changing the default here will cause with certain session backends and/or apps, and we shouldn't include this change in this RFC. If we want to compact the session id's, proposing a change for this default can be done in a separate RFC that discusses the pros and cons of doing it, independent of security. Another thing that I think this RFC is missing is some clearer explanation on what kind of apps *don't* work with the proposed changes (most notably use_strict_mode=on and cookie_httponly). Even though my gut is that these two proposed changes are good - the RFC should include explanations of the code patterns and/or types of apps and/or modules that will be affected by this; "Most apps should not be affected" isn't enough in an RFC IMHO. Last - the voting period should be at least a week, right now it's 5 (or maybe 6, depending on your POV) days. Thanks! Zeev > -----Original Message----- > From: yohgaki@gmail.com [mailto:yohgaki@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Yasuo > Ohgaki > Sent: Monday, February 17, 2014 6:27 AM > To: internals@lists.php.net > Subject: [PHP-DEV] [VOTE] Secure Session Module Options/Internal by > Default > > Hi all, > > This RFC changes default session settings and introduces a new setting > that > disables possible timing attack against session ID. All of them help to > improve > general session ID security except hash_bits_per_character change. > > NIST discourages use of SHA-1 years ago. It proposes to use > SHA-256 as the default hash function for session. To reduce size of > session ID > string, hash_bits_per_character=6 is proposed. > > https://wiki.php.net/rfc/secure-session-options-by-default > > Thank you for voting! > > P.S. Although, the change is trivial, if anyone would like to see patch > for this, > I'll prepare one ASAP. > > -- > Yasuo Ohgaki > yohgaki@ohgaki.net

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