Re: [RFC] [Discussion] Secure session_regenerate_id()
| From: | Yasuo Ohgaki | Date: | Thu, 20 Mar 2014 09:19:49 +0000 |
| Subject: | Re: [RFC] [Discussion] Secure session_regenerate_id() | ||
| References: | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | Groups: | php.internals |
| Request: | Send a blank email to internals+get-73328@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
Hi Mateusz,
On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 6:13 PM, Mateusz Kocielski <shm@digitalsun.pl>wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 05:30:36PM +0900, Yasuo Ohgaki wrote:
> > Hi Mateusz,
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 5:23 PM, Mateusz Kocielski <shm@digitalsun.pl
> >wrote:
> >
> > > > > I agree. But we've got more factors here, it's not a simple tool
> for
> > > > > detection
> > > > > of crimes. If we let "old session" live for x secs, what will
> happen to
> > > > > changes done to the old session? How do you want to resolve that?
> We
> > > should
> > > > > find a balance between complexity and security.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > Currently we have poor mitigation. My proposal provides better
> > > mitigation.
> > >
> > > I still don't see how you want to handle inconsistency between
> sessions. It
> > > seems that your RFC silently ignores that issue.
> >
> >
> > I'm not sure which inconsistency. Could you specify/describe it?
>
> Consider following scenario:
>
> 1. session_regenerate_id(..) is called
> 2. request to /update_session with old session id is done (some key-value
> in
> session is changed) - with your change this request will succeed
> --- from here user uses only new session -
> 3. updated key-value is missing in new session
>
> (same scenario can be triggered now if old session is not deleted)
This race condition will not change with or without my proposal.
Regards,
--
Yasuo Ohgaki
yohgaki@ohgaki.net