Re: Re: crypt() BC issue
| From: | Nikita Popov | Date: | Sat, 19 Jul 2014 05:46:22 +0000 |
| Subject: | Re: Re: crypt() BC issue | ||
| References: | 1 2 | Groups: | php.internals |
| Request: | Send a blank email to internals+get-75694@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
On Sat, Jul 19, 2014 at 4:15 AM, Yasuo Ohgaki <yohgaki@ohgaki.net> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 9:46 AM, Yasuo Ohgaki <yohgaki@ohgaki.net> wrote:
>
> > crypt() has BC issue with older systems.
> >
> > https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=62372&edit=1
> >
> > The reason rounds became 1000 from 10 is hardcoded lower limit for newer
> > PHPs.
> > Generally speaking, developer should never use less than 1000 rounds and
> > better to have
> > at least few thousands rounds or more, tens of thousands or more is
> > recommended.
> >
> > I would like to make this bug report 'wont fix', since migration is
> > possible.
> >
> > - Developer may use larger rounds and store updated hash when
> > user is authenticated with old PHP.
> > - Developer may ask users to reset password if password hash has
> > to fewer rounds than 1000 (i.e. outdated hash) with new PHP.
> >
> > Any comments?
> >
>
> I'm not going to touch crypt(), but password_hash() behavior that truncates
> byte larger than 72
> silently is not good.
>
> I made a bug report for this to add E_NOTICE.
> https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=67653
>
> Any comments? If not, I'll add E_NOTICE in a few days.
>
I'm against adding this notice to password_hash. This will require all
applications to ensure that passwords are shorter than 72 chars. I don't
think that's a good idea.
Nikita