Re: Re: [RFC] Distrust SHA-1 Certificates

> > Hi, > > > After reading related discussion on openssl-users [1], I'm not so > sure if > > we should be doing that at all... > > > > Especially I agree with this bit: > > > > "Making your code more complex is a far higher risk than a > practical > > certificate forgery based on a collision attack on SHA-1. " > > > > The only thing, that makes sense IMHO would be adding support for > > setting > > security level only for OpenSSL 1.1. > > > > [1] > > > > http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/Rejecting-SHA-1-certificates- > > td71439.html > > <http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.com/Rejecting-SHA-1- > > certificates-td71439.html> > > > > > > Same here actually. While it's trivial to implement with OpenSSL 1.1, > it's non- > > trivial before, because there's no API to get the trusted chain AFAIK, > so we > > would indeed have to do this inside verify_callback. > > > Thanks for the responses and for the discussion link. With that, the > situation is simplified a lot. This allows for a better conceived patch and > there's obviously no strong reason to touch the stable branches. > > Thanks. > > Anatol > @Jakub: Do we want to expose "auth_level" then in case PHP is linked against OpenSSL 1.1.0+? Regards, Niklas