Serious security hole
| From: | Ferdinand Beyer | Date: | Sat, 01 Feb 2003 17:05:50 +0000 |
| Subject: | Serious security hole | ||
| Groups: | php.smarty.general | ||
| Request: | Send a blank email to php-smarty-general+get-7449@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
Hi,
I've played a bit with Smarty's sloppy regexp-played parser and found
out that it is possible for template designers to executive _any_ PHP
code even if strict $security settings are used!
The problem is that Smarty currently does not check tag content
strictly enough and alwas tries to treat unknown content as plugins
even if the tag name contains illegal special characters.
Here is the example I used:
{assign' . substr('',
print("This is a test.")
) . ' var="name" value="Bob"}
This gets compiled to:
<?php $this->_plugins['function']['assign' . substr('',
print("This is a test.")
) . ''][0](array('var' => "name",'value' =>
"Bob"), $this); if($this-
>_extract) { extract($this->_tpl_vars); $this->_extract=false; } ?>
The template is executed without any notice or error message and
prints 'This is a test'.
print() returns true and php would convert it to 1 so that Smarty fails
loading an assign1 plugin -- that's why I used the substr() workaround
above.
If the print() call is replaced with an include statement, there is
absolutely no limit for bad consequences - especially if the included
file is on a different server (via http)! And the programmer wouldn't
even notice anything as the template output looks alright!
A solution would be a more strictly parsing routine. Perhaps some
day Smarty needs a real parser instead of using regular
expressions...
--
Ferdinand Beyer
<fbeyer@clickhand.de>