Re: [PHP4BETA] CVS update: php4/ext/session
| From: | Sascha Schumann | Date: | Tue, 08 Jun 1999 04:51:07 +0000 |
| Subject: | Re: [PHP4BETA] CVS update: php4/ext/session | ||
| References: | 1 2 3 4 5 | Groups: | php.version4 |
| Request: | Send a blank email to php-version4+get-1387@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
On Tue, Jun 08, 1999 at 06:47:31AM +0200, Sascha Schumann wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 07, 1999 at 06:06:27PM -0400, Jim Winstead wrote:
> > On Jun 07, Sascha Schumann wrote:
> > > Well, a hash algorithm with no collisions does not exist to the
> > > best of my knowledge. Hence, we can only hope that we don't
> > > produce any collisions.
> > >
> > > As Kristian said before, the algorithm must not be
> > > deterministic. Using some kind of randomness to make the ids
> > > unguessable is what I think I'll go for.
> > >
> > > I'll do some work on the user-level hooks as well today.
> >
> > Unless you are drawing your randomness from something like /dev/random,
> > it is deterministic, because all you're doing then is using the
> > "srand($deterministic_seed); rand();" steps as a glorified hash
> > function.
> >
> > The session id should be composed of both deterministic and random
> > components -- the deterministic part makes it so you can guarantee
> > there's no collisions, and the random part to make it harder for
> > people to hijack sessions.
>
> It's not that easy.
>
> Here is the proposal I'll use unless someone can point out some
> kind of weakness in it:
>
> We need a session id which is unguessable, if the attacker knows
> all normal data which is sent from the client (such as IP, user
> agent) to the server, but does not know which data is actually
> sent (else he could simply wait for the session id to be passed -
> HTTPS is the only solution in that case).
Additionally, it should make it impossible to guess the next id
from the previous one.
> Now, we use some deterministic data (the current time) which
> could be guessed. Additionally, we use a linear CG which is not
> as complex as the Mersenne Twister (which is quite new and hardly
> researched, AFAIK), but still has a periode of ~10^18. This is
> initialized on module startup and fed with various user data
> during its whole life time (/dev/random is also deterministic, we
> would need some kind of external device which provides real random
> data such as a microphone or a light diode).
>
> So, for a attacker to reproduce our session ids he would need
>
> - the knowledge which server module/thread will generate the
> session id
> - all client data (limited to static values) which have accessed
> the module/thread before
> - the time in microseconds when they have accessed the server
>
> This is not 100%, but it should make it pretty hard to simply
> guess the next session id, especially in a multiprocess or
> multithread environment. There is an attack scenario possible on
> light loaded web servers, but if one is really concerned about
> security, he uses HTTPS anyway.
>
> --
>
> Regards,
>
> Sascha Schumann
> Consultant
>
> --
> PHP 4 Beta
--
Regards,
Sascha Schumann
Consultant