Re: [PHP4BETA] CVS update: php4/ext/session

From: Date: Tue, 08 Jun 1999 04:51:07 +0000
Subject: Re: [PHP4BETA] CVS update: php4/ext/session
References: 1 2 3 4 5  Groups: php.version4 
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On Tue, Jun 08, 1999 at 06:47:31AM +0200, Sascha Schumann wrote: > On Mon, Jun 07, 1999 at 06:06:27PM -0400, Jim Winstead wrote: > > On Jun 07, Sascha Schumann wrote: > > > Well, a hash algorithm with no collisions does not exist to the > > > best of my knowledge. Hence, we can only hope that we don't > > > produce any collisions. > > > > > > As Kristian said before, the algorithm must not be > > > deterministic. Using some kind of randomness to make the ids > > > unguessable is what I think I'll go for. > > > > > > I'll do some work on the user-level hooks as well today. > > > > Unless you are drawing your randomness from something like /dev/random, > > it is deterministic, because all you're doing then is using the > > "srand($deterministic_seed); rand();" steps as a glorified hash > > function. > > > > The session id should be composed of both deterministic and random > > components -- the deterministic part makes it so you can guarantee > > there's no collisions, and the random part to make it harder for > > people to hijack sessions. > > It's not that easy. > > Here is the proposal I'll use unless someone can point out some > kind of weakness in it: > > We need a session id which is unguessable, if the attacker knows > all normal data which is sent from the client (such as IP, user > agent) to the server, but does not know which data is actually > sent (else he could simply wait for the session id to be passed - > HTTPS is the only solution in that case). Additionally, it should make it impossible to guess the next id from the previous one. > Now, we use some deterministic data (the current time) which > could be guessed. Additionally, we use a linear CG which is not > as complex as the Mersenne Twister (which is quite new and hardly > researched, AFAIK), but still has a periode of ~10^18. This is > initialized on module startup and fed with various user data > during its whole life time (/dev/random is also deterministic, we > would need some kind of external device which provides real random > data such as a microphone or a light diode). > > So, for a attacker to reproduce our session ids he would need > > - the knowledge which server module/thread will generate the > session id > - all client data (limited to static values) which have accessed > the module/thread before > - the time in microseconds when they have accessed the server > > This is not 100%, but it should make it pretty hard to simply > guess the next session id, especially in a multiprocess or > multithread environment. There is an attack scenario possible on > light loaded web servers, but if one is really concerned about > security, he uses HTTPS anyway. > > -- > > Regards, > > Sascha Schumann > Consultant > > -- > PHP 4 Beta -- Regards, Sascha Schumann Consultant

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