Re: com php-src: Add hash_hkdf(): NEWS UPGRADING ext/hash/hash.c ext/hash/php_hash.h ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_basic.phpt
ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_edges.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_error.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_rfc5869.phpt

From: Date: Sun, 15 Jan 2017 19:09:33 +0000
Subject: Re: com php-src: Add hash_hkdf(): NEWS UPGRADING ext/hash/hash.c ext/hash/php_hash.h ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_basic.phpt
ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_edges.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_error.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_rfc5869.phpt
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On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 6:46 PM, Yasuo Ohgaki <yohgaki@ohgaki.net> wrote: > Hi Nikita, > > I guess discussion was done in IRC and I'm not on IRC. What was the discussion result for > salt usage? Merged function signature has salt as the last option which encourages users to use > weaker value. > > https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5869.txt Section 3.1 > > 3.1. To Salt or not to Salt > > HKDF is defined to operate with and without random salt. This is > done to accommodate applications where a salt value is not available.* We stress, however, > that the use of salt adds significantly to the > strength of HKDF*, ensuring independence between different uses of the > hash function, supporting "source-independent" extraction, and > strengthening the analytical results that back the HKDF design. > > Random salt differs fundamentally from the initial keying material in > two ways: it is non-secret and can be re-used. As such, salt values > are available to many applications. For example, a pseudorandom > number generator (PRNG) that continuously produces outputs by > applying HKDF to renewable pools of entropy (e.g., sampled system > events) can fix a salt value and use it for multiple applications of > > > > Krawczyk & Eronen Informational [Page 4] > > RFC 5869 Extract-and-Expand HKDF May 2010 > > > HKDF without having to protect the secrecy of the salt. In a > different application domain, a key agreement protocol deriving > cryptographic keys from a Diffie-Hellman exchange can derive a salt > value from public nonces exchanged and authenticated between > communicating parties as part of the key agreement (this is the > approach taken in [IKEv2]). > > Ideally, the salt value is a random (or pseudorandom) string of the > length HashLen. Yet, even a salt value of less quality (shorter in > size or with limited entropy) may still make a significant > contribution to the security of the output keying material; designers > of applications are therefore encouraged to provide salt values to > HKDF if such values can be obtained by the application. > > *It is worth noting that, while not the typical case, some > applications may even have a secret salt value available for use; in > such a case, HKDF provides an even stronger security guarantee.* An > example of such application is IKEv1 in its "public-key encryption > mode", where the "salt" to the extractor is computed from nonces that > are secret; similarly, the pre-shared mode of IKEv1 uses a secret > salt derived from the pre-shared key. > > > To clarify, are you suggesting to swap the info and salt arguments? There is a thread about HKDF on internals. Nikita

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