Re: com php-src: Add hash_hkdf(): NEWS UPGRADING ext/hash/hash.c ext/hash/php_hash.h ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_basic.phpt
ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_edges.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_error.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_rfc5869.phpt
| From: | Nikita Popov | Date: | Sun, 15 Jan 2017 19:09:33 +0000 |
| Subject: | Re: com php-src: Add hash_hkdf(): NEWS UPGRADING ext/hash/hash.c ext/hash/php_hash.h ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_basic.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_edges.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_error.phpt ext/hash/tests/hash_hkdf_rfc5869.phpt |
||
| References: | 1 2 | Groups: | php.cvs |
| Request: | Send a blank email to php-cvs+get-96735@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
On Sun, Jan 15, 2017 at 6:46 PM, Yasuo Ohgaki <yohgaki@ohgaki.net> wrote:
> Hi Nikita,
>
> I guess discussion was done in IRC and I'm not on IRC. What was the discussion result for
> salt usage? Merged function signature has salt as the last option which encourages users to use
> weaker value.
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5869.txt Section 3.1
>
> 3.1. To Salt or not to Salt
>
> HKDF is defined to operate with and without random salt. This is
> done to accommodate applications where a salt value is not available.* We stress, however,
> that the use of salt adds significantly to the
> strength of HKDF*, ensuring independence between different uses of the
> hash function, supporting "source-independent" extraction, and
> strengthening the analytical results that back the HKDF design.
>
> Random salt differs fundamentally from the initial keying material in
> two ways: it is non-secret and can be re-used. As such, salt values
> are available to many applications. For example, a pseudorandom
> number generator (PRNG) that continuously produces outputs by
> applying HKDF to renewable pools of entropy (e.g., sampled system
> events) can fix a salt value and use it for multiple applications of
>
>
>
> Krawczyk & Eronen Informational [Page 4]
>
> RFC 5869 Extract-and-Expand HKDF May 2010
>
>
> HKDF without having to protect the secrecy of the salt. In a
> different application domain, a key agreement protocol deriving
> cryptographic keys from a Diffie-Hellman exchange can derive a salt
> value from public nonces exchanged and authenticated between
> communicating parties as part of the key agreement (this is the
> approach taken in [IKEv2]).
>
> Ideally, the salt value is a random (or pseudorandom) string of the
> length HashLen. Yet, even a salt value of less quality (shorter in
> size or with limited entropy) may still make a significant
> contribution to the security of the output keying material; designers
> of applications are therefore encouraged to provide salt values to
> HKDF if such values can be obtained by the application.
>
> *It is worth noting that, while not the typical case, some
> applications may even have a secret salt value available for use; in
> such a case, HKDF provides an even stronger security guarantee.* An
> example of such application is IKEv1 in its "public-key encryption
> mode", where the "salt" to the extractor is computed from nonces that
> are secret; similarly, the pre-shared mode of IKEv1 uses a secret
> salt derived from the pre-shared key.
>
>
>
To clarify, are you suggesting to swap the info and salt arguments?
There is a thread about HKDF on internals.
Nikita