Re: trans-sid warning?
| From: | Giancarlo Pinerolo | Date: | Wed, 21 Aug 2002 13:17:37 +0000 |
| Subject: | Re: trans-sid warning? | ||
| References: | 1 2 3 | Groups: | php.dev |
| Request: | Send a blank email to php-dev+get-87230@lists.php.net to get a copy of this message | ||
Dan Hardiker wrote:
>
> >> Well, more worrisome would be if a bad guy tricks you into clicking on
> >> a link or simply sends you an image in an email that makes a request
> >> to my server with a valid-looking session id. Then if you go to this
> >> site (that
> >
> > I've debunked that scenario already a few times. The net
> > result is that this class of attacks is impossible to
> > prevent.
> >
> > The assumption in your scenario and the following is this:
> >
> > The attacker has access to a script X which calls
> > session_start().
> >
> > My scenario:
> >
> > 1.) Attacker A accesses X and stores the SID which PHP assigns to
> > him.
> >
> > 2.) A crafts a link containing SID and sends it to victim V.
> >
> > 3.) A keeps SID alive by repeatedly accessing X using SID.
> >
> > 4.) V opens link and authenticates.
> >
> > 5.) A's script notices (4). A can overtake V's session.
>
> Ive extended the session handling so that upon session start, it takes a
> snapshot of the browser string (and maybe a couple of other
> javascript-retrieved variables about the user's os, eg: the resolution)
> and build up as much of a picture of the client as possible.
So you should pick upt that 'initial propagation mode', so later someone
can decide to block a client shift in that while pretending to remain
the same client.
Giancarlo