Re: The Game Theory of Scalar Type Hint Voting

I like it! That's what I proposed to Anthony (and Andrea before) before Zeev presented their alternative, to held a double vote on the strict vs weak feature. It was not met with much enthusiasm, hope they change their minds with your proposal! On Mon, Feb 23, 2015 at 5:43 PM, Benjamin Eberlei <kontakt@beberlei.de> wrote: > Hello, > > with two competing RFCs (has this ever happend before?) we are in an > interesting spot now, game theoretically. Just letting both RFC authors > open and close the votes will bias the votes just by nature of who starts > first. > > My (potentially very wrong) armchair analysis of the timeline is (my game > theory university knowledge is very dusty): > > We have 3 types of players, 1 RFC a author, 1 RFC b author, $n voters, > roughly (subjective opinion) split between STH v0.5, coercive STH and no > type hinting (40/40/20). > > The first vote to end, will get 40% of votes. If we assume that there are > STH proponents that don't care about the implementation and only want the > feature, then they will start to switch their vote on the second RFC now, > pushing it over 66% like Andrea's RFC managed. > > The likelihood of the second RFC winning, REGARDLESS which one that is, is > much higher. So both RFC authors have no incentive to start their vote > first, delaying the vote. > > One solution could be both votes should be parallel. In this case the > likelihood of both failing is very high, because you cannot vote with a > preference here, you will vote yes for one and no for the other. In either > case, if both votes end at exactly the same time, I think this could get > some ebay sniping vote sswitch behavior. > > So the best/fairest option might probably, vote for both combined in a > single vote. This makes the likelihood of acceptance very high, however it > will pick one or the other by 50%+1, which might be against the voting RFC. > > In any case, funny problem :-) > > greetings > Benjamin >