Re: [RFC][Discussion] Add PASSWORD_BCRYPT_WRAP

From: Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 18:40:33 +0000
Subject: Re: [RFC][Discussion] Add PASSWORD_BCRYPT_WRAP
References: 1 2 3 4 5  Groups: php.internals 
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Hello Rowan Tommins, >RFC link: https://wiki.php.net/rfc/password_bcrypt_wrap ========= Comment 2 ========= (Mirco Babin) > My question is misunderstood. Why does BCRYPT_WRAP not have a very > first step 0 that validates that*password* is human typable, valid > utf-8 and does not contain control characters? (Rowan Tommins) >Why would it? Is there some security or usability standard you can >point to that suggests that password input be limited in this way? (Mirco Babin) When a password can consist of bytes, it is no longer a password intended for human entry; instead, it functions more like an API key. When the Bcrypt-2a revision was introduced, UTF-8 was apparently also made mandatory. However, I cannot find a primary source for this claim. A secondary source is: https://javadoc.io/doc/at.favre.lib/bcrypt/latest/at/favre/lib/crypto/bcrypt/BCrypt.Version.html#VERSION_2A ========= Comment 4 ========= (Mirco Babin) > Why isn't this bugfixed then. So PASSWORD_ARGON2ID will become > available out of the box? (Rowan Tommins) >It is not a "bug" to be "fixed"; it is a decision about what >libraries are included in the source tree of PHP, and which are left >as optional dependencies. > >PHP can have Argon2 support via one of three external libraries: >libargon2, libsodium, or openssl. Making it available in all builds >means including a copy of one of those libraries directly in the >source tree. So the decision can be made to make PASSWORD_ARGON2ID available everywhere. The decision of supporting a security standard versus introducing this non-standard self-invented-security-algorithm RFC that violates OWASP recommendations. I assume Php does not consider itself a LEGACY SYSTEM as OWASP calls it? OWASP states: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html#bcrypt >The bcrypt password hashing function should only be used for >password storage in legacy systems where Argon2 and scrypt are not >available. ============ Comment 7(b) ============ (Rowan Tommins) >This is a completely nonsensical comparison. >A standard bcrypt output contains 23 bytes of final hash data; that's >"only" 2.5 x 10^55 possible outputs. A 54-byte pre-hash has >1.1 x 10^130 possible values. (Mirco Babin) I'm going to provide an example. Consider a password being exactly 72 bytes, without 0x00-bytes. The Bcrypt-plain scenario: -------------------------- The input for the Bcrypt algorithm is exactly the 72-bytes-plain-password. There are 72*8 significant inputbits. The Bcrypt-wrap scenario: ------------------------- The RFC states: >Whichever prehash function is chosen, 54 bytes of binary output >are B64-encoded to fill the 72-byte space allowed by Bcrypt. The 72-bytes-plain-password is prehashed. The hash-function is of no importance, because Bcrypt-wrap states the prehash-ouput is always 54 bytes. Even though the 54 bytes are base64-encoded and expanded to 72 bytes, there are still only 54*8 significant inputbits after the base64-encoding. These 54*8 significant inputbits are input for Bcrypt. Conclusion: ----------- The bcrypt-plain is giving 72*8 significant inputbits to Bcrypt. The bcrypt-wrap-prehashed-password is giving 54*8 significant inputbits to Bcrypt. That is a deterioration of 18*8 bits, or 25%. Kind regards, Mirco Babin

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